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Syria’s civil war remains a bloody stalemate between government forces and various 
opposition groups. The conflict continues to impact neighboring states with spillover 
fighting and increased economic burdens from refugees. In light both of Syria’s 
importance to regional stability and in recent lessons learned from a lack of post-conflict 
planning, it is important for academics and policy makers to consider potential 
stabilization policies for a post-conflict Syria. 
 This thesis explores a scenario where a post-Assad Syria faces a transition from 
civil war toward peace with its current borders and internal divisions. Under this 
construct, the challenges of creating a security environment, engineering a democracy, 
and achieving reconciliation stand out as both opportunities and obstacles in building a 
lasting peace in a divided Syria. Different approaches to each of these challenges are 
analyzed by comparing theoretical literature and case studies. In drawing lessons from 
different states’ shared experiences, a rough outline of best practices is drawn. Finally, 
Syria’s specific context is applied, offering a potential framework for a post-conflict 
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Syria joined the string of protests against authoritarian rule known as the Arab 
Spring, and is still caught in the midst. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, and other less successful 
protests, Syria has been violent. Yet also unlike Libya, no side appears to be dominant: 
for two years violence increased in Syria as the government and rebel forces have been 
locked in a bloody stalemate. Insurgents and state forces each control regions in Syria. 
International forces have not endorsed intervention, although both sides are being armed 
externally. Russia supplies the Syrian military while Saudi Arabia and Qatar supply the 
opposition forces.1  The conflict and its dynamics are significant because of Syria’s 
importance to the long-term stability of the region. The country occupies a key 
geostrategic position bordering Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Turkey, states that are 
already experiencing spillover fighting and greater economic burdens due to increasing 
numbers of refugees.2  In light of both the country’s importance and the lessons learned 
from lack of post-conflict planning in other states, it is important that academics and 
policy makers consider potential stabilization policies for a post-conflict Syria.   
In this thesis, I explore the challenges of building a lasting peace in a post-conflict 
Syria and assess potential solutions to those challenges. While the fate of Syria is not 
known and no particular outcome is assumed in this study, in the event of Assad’s 
removal from power a future government will be faced with considerable stabilization 
obstacles.3  The immediate post-conflict landscape in Syria will include the presence of 
multiple armed groups, a sectarian divide, and the perceived threat of reprisal among 
ethnic groups. Three pressing challenges that may placate or exasperate these issues 
include how to establish a secure environment, what type of democracy is engineered (in  
 
                                                 
1Daniel Serwer, “Post-Assad Syria,” PRISM 3, no. 4 (2012), 3. 
2 Josh Wood, “Effects of Instability Spill Over to Syria’s Neighbors,” New York Times, accessed 
March 8, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/world/middleeast/effects-of-instability-spill-over-to-
syrias-neighbors.html.  
3 If Assad’s government remains, the choice of stabilization measures would be similar to those listed 
in this study, but policy makers and academics would have little influence over the course of events in that 
scenario. 
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the likely event that a new regime opts for democracy), and how reconciliation is 
managed. The difficulty and importance of these issues is apparent today in Iraq, Libya, 
Egypt, and Tunisia.   
This thesis will assess different approaches to post-conflict challenges and 
opportunities by analyzing and comparing theoretical literature and case studies. While a 
strict comparative analysis remains the best method for yielding conclusions, this 
approach is not possible here. Such a task requires controlling a host of conditions and 
variables in each post-conflict environment and measuring them against predefined 
criteria for success. Not only are there too many variables at work in an immediate post-
conflict environment to perform this accurately, but the context of each post-conflict 
society is unique, leaving no possible example that can fit Syria’s specific case.   
Instead, I take a broad approach of analyzing how different states have pursued 
policies in meeting these three challenges and drawing lessons from their shared 
experiences. With this rough outline of best practices, Syria’s specific context is then 
applied to plan a potential framework for Syria. While imperfect, this methodology is the 
next best possible technique to guiding Syria. This approach also requires examining a 
range of post-conflict societies, many of which are far removed the Middle East. The 
Arab Spring may eventually offer the most relevant future lessons learned for Syria. 
However, many current issues inside new regimes such as Egypt and Tunisia are still 
evolving and thus not assessed yet (aside from some immediate failures discussed such as 
the handing of the militias in Libya).  
 Not every post-conflict society faces the same challenges for securing long term 
peace. The internal context of a state and the circumstances of a conflict’s end ultimately 
set the immediate challenges. In Syria for instance, if the government forces were to 
completely crush the rebels in a total victory, democratic engineering is unlikely to be a 
concern for the authoritarian state. Another possible outcome is the partition of a separate 
Alawi state, in which case border security is likely to be more pressing than 
reconciliation. Assessing every possible future outcome and its specific challenges and 
solutions becomes an ad infinitum process. For this reason, this thesis selected a single 
scenario where a post-Assad Syria transitions from civil war toward peace with the same 
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borders and internal divisions. This possibility may be deemed optimistic, but it is 
certainly not unimaginable. Arguably, it may also represent the only option to construct a 
meaningful peace in Syria. 
Regardless of what path leads Syria to this scenario, the same challenges remain. 
How to build peace in a divided society through a secure environment, a new democracy, 
and a reconciliation approach?  After any peace process, Syria will still possess a number 
of armed groups scattered throughout the country including the Syrian military, security 
services, and a range of state and rebel militias.4  All it takes is one uncontrolled group to 
continue violence and spark a return to civil war or even ethnic war. In engineering a 
democracy, not only is the groundwork built for how effective a government can be, but 
sectarian divides can be manipulated by the manner of how political power is allotted. 
Many Christian, Alawi, and Druze minorities in Syria already fear what a Sunni 
dominated state will mean for their future.5  If Syria ignores its past, or uses a 
reconciliation process to assign mass blame on minority groups, sectarian tensions may 
keep the state trapped in a volatile and precarious position similar to Lebanon. 
Deep sectarian divisions do not go away overnight, but they can quickly explode 
into ethnic wars or genocide if not managed. Even if these worst case outcomes do not 
result immediately, postwar failures in meeting these challenges can fragment society and 
lead to instability as evident in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, or recent Libya.6  For these 
reasons, it is important that policy makers give early consideration on how a post-Assad 
Syria can meet these challenges and build a long-term peace among a divided society. If 
Syria’s diverse ethnic groups are to coexist peacefully, solutions are required that 
minimize sectarian tensions. Examining approaches to establish a security environment, 
engineer a democracy, and manage reconciliation in a divided society may also be 
relevant in similar post-conflict societies.  
                                                 
4 Serwer, “Post-Assad,” 4. 
5 Jonathan Randall, “Syria’s Threatened Minorities,” New York Times, May 5, 2012.  Accessed 15 
March, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/opinion/syrias-threatened-minorities.html?_r=0.  
6 Serwer, “Post-Assad,” 4. 
 4 
This thesis begins with a survey of Syrian history in order to understand why 
Syria never developed into a nation state and how it became such a divided place today. 
The next three chapters focus separately on the challenges of security, democracy, and 
reconciliation in divided societies. Literature from leading academics and case studies of 
how other countries have met these challenges are examined to shape a rough template of 
options. Finally, the fifth chapter attempts to fill in the blanks where possible with Syria’s 
specific context in order to craft a Syrian model.   The concluding framework presented 
for a post-Assad Syria model is outlined below. The author does not claim to have 
provided a definitive solution to these challenges for Syria, but hopefully offer a starting 
point for further discussion.   
 End large scale violence with a negotiated peace settlement between the 
leaders of all armed groups- not figurehead representatives. 
 Peace settlement should call for international guarantees and agree on an 
arms management structure to control violence. 
 Armed groups are held accountable by combination of its leaders agreeing 
to abide by treaty terms and capable international force to deter any side 
from reneging.  
 Credible third party peacekeeping force best way to manage domestic 
anarchy and prisoner’s dilemma between rebel and government forces.   
 Turkey and Russia each represent the strongest combination of state 
interest and military capacity to take the lead role of an international 
peacekeeping mission in Syria. 
 The monopoly of violence should gradually be returned to a Syrian 
government by an agreed upon plan that manages security sector reform 
and disarmament of armed groups. Rebels groups cannot be expected to 
disarm if state security forces still pose threat. 
 There is no clear superior approach to security reform and disarmament. 
The important factor is to sequence the two in a combined agreed upon 
approach. Creating new state security apparatus with select integration of 
rebels through joint committees may be one practical solution as many 
rebel leaders are career military leaders.  
 Syria should adopt a power sharing democracy for a limited time period to 
facilitate the transition to peace. During this time, all groups will have a say 
in drafting a constitution, legal framework, and truth commission. To avoid 
locking in ethnic differences and becoming politically deadlocked, 
government should transition to a power dividing democratic model. 
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 Syria must face its past, uncover the truth, and provide a national narrative 
of what happened during Assad’s rule in power. This begins with 
empowering a neutral, independent truth commission that investigates 
human rights abuses on all sides. 
 Justice must be delivered in Syria to the extent possible on an individual 
basis and to both sides. Any negotiated peace with elites is likely to call for 
immunity from prosecution.   Those not protected may benefit for a truth 
for amnesty program if there is a credible threat of prosecution. Witnesses, 
judges, lawyers must be protected and free from intimidation. 
 Balancing the desire for justice with the need for reconciliation is a fine 
line with no set way to determine where it should go. Based on history, 
Syria stands a better chance of building a long term peace when the 
approach is closer to amnesty/forgiveness in the name of reconciliation 
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II. SYRIA: A STATE WITHOUT A NATION 
The Syrian state today is defined as the 114,000 square mile territory (just larger 
than North Dakota) that borders on Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and the Mediterranean 
Sea. It is an ancient land continued to be called home by many groups since the dawn of 
human civilization. Aleppo and Damascus are considered the oldest continually occupied 
cities in the world.7  The nation of Syria however, is elusive to find much less define. The 
22.5 million occupants of Syria are divided by sharply divided and are engaged in a bitter 
civil war, costing the lives of over 60,000 people according to the UN (as of January 
2013).8  The conflict is complex, with sides largely based around ethnic lines, fractious 
opposition leadership struggling to gain legitimacy over splintered rebel groups, spillover 
fighting among neighboring states, and continued external interference. Any attempt to 
understand how the Syrian people reached this point must begin with an examination of 
Syria’s history. Who are the diverse groups living in Syria, why are they so divided, what 
have the people lived through, and what are each of their goals in this war?  
A. GREATER SYRIA, THE PROVINCE 
Ancient Syria was considered to be the greater Levant region comprising 
Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Territories, and parts of Jordan.9  This area served as a 
crossroads between different cultures of Near East, Africa, and Europe. Greater Syria 
maintained vast resources including: coastal timbers, wine, olives, agricultural products, 
textiles, furniture, metal-work, glass, etc.10 Kingdoms and empires fought for dominance 
across this bridge for thousands of years. Regions of Greater Syria were occupied by a 
diverse range of peoples including: Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, Egyptians, 
                                                 
7 Central Intelligence Agency, “World Fact Book: Syria,” continually updated.  Accessed 12 
November 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.   
8 Joe Sterling and Salma Abdelaziz, “U.N.’s Syria Death Toll Jumps Dramatically To 60,000-Plus,” 
CNN. January 2, 2013.  Accessed January 12, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/02/world/meast/syria-
civil-war.  
9 Horst Klengel, Syria 3000 to 300 B.C. A Handbook of Political History (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1992), 17. 
10 Ibid., 17–19. 
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Phoenicians, Aramaen, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Seleucids, Romans, 
Byzantines, Muslim Arabs, European Crusaders, Ottoman Turks, and the French. The 
conquerors of Syria largely treated the region as a province with a distant external 
authority.11  This mixing pot of diverse cultures under a decentralized rule, offers one 
insight into why a nation of early Syrians failed to emerge. 
From man’s earliest recorded empires until the end of colonialism, Syria was 
almost always externally governed by either an Eastern or Western empire. Alexander the 
Great ended Syria’s rule by early Bronze Age Eastern empires, with his conquests in 332 
B.C. of the Persians. For the next thousand years, Western Empires dominated Syria wit 
rulers of Macedonians, Seleucids (one of Alexander’s successors), Romans, and 
Byzantines.12  No empires were to have the lasting impact on Syria as the Islamic 
Empires of the Umayyad, Abbasids, and Ottomans. These empires placed Syria back 
under Eastern control from the mid-7th through the early 20th centuries.13 They did not 
rule all of Syria continuously as Egypt, the Seljuks, Mongols, and European crusaders 
invaded and established areas of control for a period of time. These temporary invaders 
did not hinder the Arabic character that Syria acquired under the Islamic Empires. Islamic 
culture, religion, and Arabic language became mainstays in the Greater Syria province 
that has continued to dominate today.14   
The Ottoman Empire was the last Islamic Empire to rule Greater Syria. It also 
practiced a form of decentralized rule from Istanbul with a provincial administration 
system. Local leaders were expected to govern areas and collect taxes from their assigned 
provinces on behalf of the empire.15  The Empire was an Islamic (Sunni) state with 
restrictions on state and military service limited to Muslims. However, as Ahl al-Kitab 
(Peoples of the Book), the Christians and Jews were recognized religions and protected 
by the empire. There were times of hostility between the religious groups, but largely 
                                                 
11 John F. Devlin, Syria Modern State in an Ancient Land (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 5-10. 
12 Ibid., 6. 
13 Ibid., 6–10 
14 Ibid. 
15 A.L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria (Edinburgh: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), 28–30. 
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Christians and Jews were allowed to live in their own religious communities (millets) 
undisturbed.16  Historian Albert Hourani describes these as: 
Each was a “world,” sufficient to its members and exacting their ultimate 
loyalty. The worlds touched bud did not mingle with each other; each 
looked at the rest with suspicion and even hatred. Almost all were 
stagnant, unchanging and limited; but the Sunni world, although torn by 
every sort of internal dissension, had something universal, a self-
confidence and season of responsibility which the others lacked.17 
The Ottoman Empire did not afford the same millet status to the Alawi and Druze, 
or any other Muslim-offshoot religion that was not the pure Sunni Orthodox.18  These 
groups were looked down upon by the Ottomans and they often had a violent history with 
one another other. The Alawi and Druze are from less accessible regions of Greater Syria, 
making it easier for them to withdraw to their mountains and survive on their own away 
from central authority.19  The Ottomans tried imposing their authority several times with 
military expeditions to collect taxes or to respond to Alawi and Druze plundering.20  Both 
of these minority groups, while resilient survivors, were also extremely poor. Many 
Alawi in the Latakia region worked as sharecroppers under wealthy Sunni landlords. 
Anti-Sunni resentment was very real by the time the Ottoman Empire collapsed.21 
Underlying tensions between the Sunni and the other religious minorities also 
began to grow during the 19th century. Britain, France, and Russia began to meddle in 
the Ottoman state’s affairs claiming themselves “protectors.”  Britain developed friendly 
relations with the Jews, France claimed to look after the Maronite Christians of Lebanon, 
and the Russians claimed their right to protect the Greek Orthodox subjects.22  The Sunni 
began to view these minority groups as instruments of imperial European policies and 
                                                 
16 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle For Power in Syria (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Itamar Rabinovich, “The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–45,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 14, no. 4 (1979): 694.  
19 Van Dam, Struggle For Power, 2. 
20 Rabinovich, “Compact Minorities,” 694. 
21 Ibid., 703. 
22 Van Dam, Struggle For Power, 3. 
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distrusted them as a potential threat to the Empire and the Islamic community as a whole. 
As a consequence, relations between the Sunni majority and the religious minorities of 
Greater Syria deteriorated.23 
B. SYRIA THE CLIENT STATE 
The defeat of the Ottomans in World War I collapsed the final empire in the string 
of Muslim Empires that dominated Syria for centuries. Many in Syria were anxious to the 
see the demise of the Ottoman sultan and hoped to shed foreign rule for autonomy and 
self-government.24  The leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, Amir 
Faysal Ibn Husayni, quickly established a Syrian Congress in Damascus and on October 
5, 1918, declared an “independent Arab constitutional government with authority over all 
Syria.”25  France had no intention of permitting such an independent state and ensured 
Syria’s legacy of foreign rule continued. Under its governance, France sharpened the 
ethnic differences of Syria as a means of control. 
England and France established their imperial designs on the Middle East in 1916 
with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This arrangement decided how to divide and share 
influence in the Ottoman territories between them once the empire was defeated.26  
England had an empire to maintain that required access to markets, the Eastern 
Mediterranean, cheap oil, and a protected route to India. France interests included: 
preserving ties with Maronite Christians, establishing an economic base in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and containing Arab nationalism from spreading to French North 
Africa.27  An independent Syria was not in England or France’s interests, but a client 
state could be. France secretly agreed to recognize a greater Syria (without Lebanon) 
ruled by Faysal as King, provided he accept French control of Syria’s economy, military,  
 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Devlin, Syria Modern State, 12–13. 
25 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule,” Middle East 
Policy 18, no. 4 (2011): 130.  
26 Devlin, Syria Modern State, 38. 
27 Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria,” 129. 
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and foreign policy. The Syrian Congress rejected this deal in March of 1920 and declared 
an unconditional, independent “United Syrian Kingdom” that included Palestine and 
Lebanon.28 
The following month the League of Nation’s established mandates for Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq at the San Remo Conference. In theory, the mandate system 
was a device that allowed a mandatory power to assist a “lesser advanced” state in a 
transition to self-rule. In reality, it proved to be an imperial tool that gave great powers a 
façade to pursue their own agendas without consequence to the wishes and interests of 
the native population.29  Armed with an international mandate, France soon gave Faysal 
an ultimatum, sent troops to Damascus, forced Faysal and his government into exile, and 
imposed a mandate rule on Syria that served French interests.30   
Not a stranger to nationalism and revolution, France viewed Arab nationalism as 
the biggest threat to its authority and control in Syria. Centuries of Ottoman rule left the 
heartland of Syria with an Arab and Muslim orientation. 31  Even the Alawi and Druze 
minorities on the periphery of Syria, both spoke Arabic and their religions could be 
considered Muslim-related as a radical sect of Shiism.32  To contain any united 
nationalist sentiment or action, France implemented a divide and rule strategy. This was 
achieved by dividing Greater Syria into separate political units (along ethnic lines where 
possible), empowering minority rule, and encouraging regionalism.33  This ultimately led 
to heightened distrust between the minorities and majority Sunni as well as a regional 
separatism that hindered any united Syrian national movement. 
The most influential Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo were initially each 
given their own states to include the next largest cities of Hama and Homs. A local 
governor ruled over these states in conjunction with an assigned French advisor. 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 131. 
29 Ibid., 135–36. 
30 Ibid., 132. 
31 Ibid., 134 
32 Rabinovich, “Compact Minorities,” 694. 
33 Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria,” 132–134. 
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Ultimately, France was forced to combine the two districts under one administration in 
1925 as a result of expenses.34  Outside of the heartland Syria, other regions were made 
separate states and kept under isolation from the center. This helped to ensure that local 
elites stayed concerned with their regions and their people. Localism became an obstacle 
for any nationalist movement that wanted to unite all of Syria.   
Lebanon—always part of the Greater Syria territory historically—was detached 
and given its own state Le Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) in 1920. A range of Eastern 
Churches was concentrated in the region and eagerly wanted their own Christian 
homeland under French rule and protection. Many majority Muslim-populated areas were 
also incorporate into the new state, who strongly opposed a Christian-dominated state.35  
With Christian allies in control, Lebanon was less of a threat for France. By forcing a 
state into existence without an identity and shaping the polity based on religion, France 
directly created sectarian quagmire that is still unresolved and continues to haunt present 
day Lebanon.   
The Alawi and Druze presented an ideal opportunity for France to divide the 
largest two minority groups from the heartland of Sunni Syria. Both groups are compact 
minorities (regionally concentrated) with an antagonistic history of interaction with the 
Sunni.36  Emphasizing the unique ethnic differences, France created the state of Latakia 
for the Alawites and Jabal Druze for the Druze in 1922.37  Once these groups had 
political autonomy over their homelands, the idea of joining into a larger Arab entity that 
would make them a negligible minority became unattractive. Furthermore, any nationalist 
attempt to unify Syria that was intolerant of regional concerns or self-autonomy could 
simply be perceived as Sunnis trying to subordinate non-Sunnis into their rule again.38 
Another element to France’s divide and rule strategy was to allow different ethnic 
groups to dominate in different branches of Syrian government. Most significant, is in 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria,” 133. 
36 Rabinovich, “Compact Minorities,” 684. 
37 Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria,” 134–135. 
38 Rabinovich, “Compact Minorities,” 699. 
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recruitment of the French-controlled local military, Troupes Speciales du Levant, used to 
maintain order and suppress rebellions.39  France favored a military rank and file of rural 
minorities because they were farther from the Arab nationalism ideology that existed 
primarily in the urban areas. The Sunni comprised the majority of the officer corps and 
mostly originated from rural areas and small towns.40 Many of the urban Sunnis, 
especially the wealthy families, refused to allow their sons to join and serve France’s 
interests. While these Sunnis general despised the military, it was an attractive option for 
minorities like the Alawites to increase their social status with a secure salary and a 
position of importance.41  The future Syrian army entailed 8 infantry battalions of which 
nearly half were Alawites. Additionally there were special detachments comprised of 
strictly Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Circassaions.42 
C. SOVEREIGN SYRIA 
Just as the end of the First World War resulted in a transition of power in Syria, 
the Second World War did so again and finally set the stage for Syrian independence. 
France’ early defeat left Nazi Germany free to utilize Vichy French territories like Syria 
to support their aircraft. This was unacceptable for Great Britain, who soon led a military 
force alongside the Free French to occupy Syria.43 When the war ended, France was 
reluctant to cede control of Syria, causing an explosion of anti-French protests and 
military response. Britain leveraged its position of power and authority to negotiate from 
France a withdrawal of their troops. On April 17, 1946, the last French forces departed 
Syria, leaving the region free to govern itself for the first time.44 
France’s departure gave Syria an independence day to celebrate, but offered little 
else to Syria in terms of preparing to govern an independent state. Two decades of French 
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ruling Syrian under a mandate to prepare Syria for self-rule and still “Syria remained 
without independence, without institutions of self-government and without territorial 
unity.”45  France did develop infrastructure and a system of state schools, including the 
University of Damascus.46  Ultimately, French policies divided Syria on ethnic and 
regional lines and hindered the development of any consolidated Syrian-nation state. 
There was no Syrian identity in the new independent Syrian state.47   
Political elites emerged in Syria who had little experience in running a national 
government and were largely concerned with their regional problems. Some were 
despised for achieving wealth and power though conciliation with the French.48  Adding 
to the challenges of new Syrian government was reintegrating the Alawi and Druze 
regions that were accustomed to autonomy and now naturally suspicious of Sunni elites. 
Habib Kahalah, a member of the first Syrian Parliament described the 1947 Parliament 
characteristics:  “I look around me and see only a bundle of contradictions… Men whom 
nothing united, sharing no principles… some were illiterate, others distinguished men of 
letters; some spoke only Kurdish or Armenian, others only Turkish; some wore a tarbush, 
others a kafiyeh…”49 
The period of 1946–1971 for Syria is perhaps best described as chaotic. The 
Syrian government faced a myriad of challenges including: how to overcome deeply 
rooted regionalism and political rivalries, construct an economy independent of France, 
manage state resources, and handle international relations. Israel was also created during 
this time as a dangerous neighbor who proved more than capable of defeating Syrian 
military forces.50  Syria’s humiliating defeat and angry populace opened the door for the 
military to insert itself in politics with a coup in March of 1949.51  There would be six 
                                                 
45 Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria,” 136. 
46 Devlin, Syria Modern State, 43. 
47 Fildis, “Alawite-Sunni Rivalry,” 150. 
48 David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 7. 
49 Fildis, “Alawite-Sunni Rivalry,” 150. 
50 Lesch, Lion of Damascus, 8. 
51 Ibid. 
 15 
more major changes in government over the next six years, mostly as a result of 
additional military coups.52  The rise of the Ba’ath and military power were to set Syria 
on its current course.  
While there was no specific Syrian identity after independence, there was a strong 
pull toward an Arab identity. Arab nationalists throughout the post-Ottoman provinces 
advocated unifying as an Arab people and shedding the artificial boundaries imposed by 
Europe. Arab nationalism was historically associated with Sunni Islamism that placed all 
other non-Sunni Arabs in a secondary status. 53  Syria’s religious minorities suspected 
these movements. A more moderate Pan-Arabism ideology also emerged that the Arab 
states should cooperate together in matters of culture, economics, politics, and other such 
spheres.54  From this grew an alternative form of pan-Arab nationalism that was to leave 
a permanent impact on Syria today—Ba’athism. 
The Ba’ath party was formed by an Orthodox Christian and a Sunni Muslim in 
1940. They advocated a united secular Arab society where Arabs were equal based on 
being an Arab, be they Sunni, Shia, Alawite, Christian, etc. 55  The minorities of Syria 
found this form of nationalism much more appealing. The party later included socialism 
as “social justice for the poor and underprivileged.”56  Soon, the party had a strong 
following of peasants, rural farmers, and minority cadets and officers. The party was 
disbanded in 1958 (along with every other political party) during a three-year union with 
Egypt. Many Ba’ath military officers continued to meet in secret, with its leaders being 
two Alawites and a Druze. When the experiment with Egypt failed, the military was 
poised to stage yet another coup in March of 1963.57 
                                                 
52 Douglas Little, “Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945–1958,” Middle 
East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990): 56. 
53 Fildis, “Alawite-Sunni Rivalry,” 153. 
54 Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 103. 
55 Fildis, “Alawite-Sunni Rivalry,” 153. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 152. 
 16 
The 1963 coup served as the final reagent to fundamentally alter the military 
leadership. The Sunni had always maintained control of the military by placing Sunni 
senior officers in top positions. After years of military coups and rival factions, the Sunni 
representation dropped as the minority officers rose to higher positions, particularly the 
Alawites.  “As Sunni officers eliminated each other, Alawites inherited their positions 
and became increasingly senior; as one Alawi rose through the ranks, he brought his 
kinsmen along.”58  After the March coup, political opponents and military officers were 
purged and Alawites filled the ranks of new positions. Graduating Sunni cadets were 
denied their commissions. Sunni Ba’ath officers attempted a violent a counter-coup on 
July 18th, 1963 against the minority officers and failed. The Alawites were in firm 
control of the Syrian military and Ba’ath political party.59 
D. ASSAD SYRIA 
In 1970, the Alawi General Hafiz al-Assad seized power in what was Syria’s 20th 
military coup (including attempts) since gaining independence in 1946.60  The immediate 
challenge facing the new president was to bring stability to Syria. To that end, Hafiz 
Assad was successful in achieving stability through crafting a strong authoritarian state. 
His firm grasp on the ruling Ba’ath party and military ended the factional infighting 
among the political and military elites that plagued Syria for decades.61  Hafiz did receive 
two challenges to his authority during his three decades of power. His brother Rif’at 
attempted a take over after Hafiz had a heart attack and Sunni fundamentalists staged a 
failed uprising in Hama. Hafiz prevailed in both instances and continued a stable 
government.62  This stability was maintained through developing a cross-ethnic support 
base and maintaining an efficient and loyal security apparatus. 
Assad Syria has privileged many Alawi but it has never been simply a client state 
for the Alawi. Such a state would surely be unstable and unlikely to survive. Hafiz made 
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a range of efforts to build a broad base. A rural land reform act mobilized a significant 
number of farmer peasants. The Ba’ath party was an instrumental device in reaching both 
peasants and bourgeoisie through professional associations, unions, and other such mass 
organizations.63  Many of the middle class were brought into the regime’s support 
structure through government-driven economic liberalization and by becoming dependent 
on the state for employment in the public sector and state agencies. Additionally, the 
Alawi military elites formed alliances with Damascene Sunni business elites and 
Christians.64  And while the secular nature of government appealed to the minority 
religions, Hafiz also made direct efforts to reach the Sunni including performing public 
prayers, quoting from the Quran in speeches, and appearing in public with senior Sunni 
religious officials.65   
The military and intelligence services are the backbone of Assad’s power. Hafiz 
became the first Syrian leader to have a firm control of all the armed forces.66  He used 
this power to control appointments and dismissals of loyal family and Alawi officers in 
key operational commands. The intelligence services actively conduct surveillance on the 
population for any potential threat to the state, have extra-legal powers, and maintain files 
on select individual’s loyalty.67  The service is also responsible for screening military 
officers and political candidates before being eligible for promotion or office. This 
allowed Assad an ability to exert control over military and political centers of power. 
Finally, Assad routinely replaced regional security chiefs to prevent someone from using 
their power to establish a fiefdom.68 
When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, he inherited the same Syrian 
power structure that provided stability but also the same problems that threatened the 
continuity. One such unresolved problem is the sectarian cleavage between the Sunni 
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majority and the religious and ethnic minorities.69  Despite some alliances and measures 
aimed at gaining support, Hafiz was never able to unify Syria. The majority of Sunni who 
did not directly benefit from Ba’athist rule, continued to perceive the regime as a 
sectarian Alawi-dominated government who took power by force and now wield it to 
suppress the people and their religion.70  This is a deep-rooted problem but was not the 
most pressing for Bashar. The combination of class alliances and a strong security 
apparatus was enough to contain the problem for his father (as evident when the military 
crushed the 1982 Sunni uprising in Hama).71   
A more immediate challenge for Bashar Assad was the state of the Syrian 
economy. Syria retained a largely unreformed socialist economy under Hafiz Assad with 
a rapid population expansion.72 In 2001, the World Bank estimated that the population 
growth in Syria would require a 5% GDP growth just to sustain development. Corruption 
and inefficient allocation of resources made this impossible. The public sector employed 
73% of the labor force while answering for only 33% of the GDP. 73  The government 
spent nearly half of its revenue on maintaining the military and intelligence services 
while the national debt continues to increase. Oil is the primary source of revenue for the 
state yet the reserves are continuing to dwindle in production. Domestic consumption has 
increased, lowering the amount available for export.74 
Bashar Assad made economic reform one of his first priorities. Corruption was a 
known problem among state and military elites that have continually used its power to 
enrich themselves. Early on under Hafiz Assad, these elites were once eager forces for 
radical change. Now that a system has awarded them wealth and privileges, they became 
                                                 
69 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 35. 
70 Van Dam, Struggle For Power, 139–141. 
71 Ibid., 111–112. 
72 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 33–34. 
73 Jeremy M. Sharp and Alfred B. Prados, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations With the United 
States After the Iraq War, U.S. Congressional Research Service  Report RL32727 (Washington DC: Office 
of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 20, 2006), 9. 
74 Ibid., 10. 
 19 
obstacles for radical change.75  Assad began by purging many of his father’s old guard 
elites in the military and bureaucracy and appointing younger replacements loyal to 
himself.76 In 2003, Assad made the bold decree that all future appointments to 
government positions and public economic sector would be merit-based rather than party 
affiliation. Furthermore, the Ba’ath party was directed to stop intervention in the 
economy and the government would now be responsible for initiating new policy-making 
procedures. The president also initiated an anti-corruption campaign and encouraged the 
media to conduct investigative reporting.77   
Under Bashar Assad, Syria made some economic progress. But overall, the 
economic problems continued to grow faster than reforms. Syria’s relations with Iran and 
Hezbollah have left the country in position of international isolation. Strong U.S.-led 
sanctions limit western banks and businesses from investing and significantly reduced the 
amount of trade flowing in and out of Syria. Syria is unable to even repair the Boeing 
planes from its national air carrier Syrian Arab Airlines or procure new ones from Europe 
(as Airbus uses American parts in its planes).78  From 2003–04, 5.1 million Syrians (over 
30% of the population) were living below the poverty line.79  The old problems of a 
heavy public sector employment, high military spending, and corruption remained, as 
new economic woes emerged. 
As oil revenues began to decline, less money was available for government 
infrastructure. Yet the demands continued to grow with population growth and an 
unforeseen burden of Iraq war refugees. A 2007 IMF estimate claimed that Iraqi refugees 
numbered 1.3 million or 7% of the Syrian population (with less than 80,000 receiving  
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international aid).80  Most of these refugees settled in urban areas, causing an increased 
demand in housing, energy, and food that could not be effectively matched by supply. As 
a result, there was an increase in real estate, rental, food, and energy prices as well as a 
rising inflation.81  There was also a heavy increase on public services like hospitals and 
education, where overcrowding and working double-shifts became common. The Syrian 
government reported that the refugees were costing them $2 billion per year, and closed 
their border to Iraq and increased entry visa requirements in response.82  Adding to these 
troubles, four consecutive droughts hit Syria from 2006–10, collapsing irrigation systems, 
reducing wheat production, killing livestock, forcing hundreds of villages to migrate, and 
pushing 2–3 million people into extreme poverty.83   
Syria continued to be a repressive police state marred in economic problems, 
when the Arab Spring began in December of 2010 with protests in Tunisia. Small 
isolated protests grew into massive civil unrest and popular demand for regime change. 
This spread throughout North Africa and then into the Middle East. Assad and others 
believed that the strong security apparatus and public fear of sectarian violence would 
prevent the uproar from reaching Syria.84  In March of 2011, children in Dara’a were 
arrested and tortured for scrawling anti-government graffiti. This proved to be the 
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The government responded with some half-hearted reform measures and brutal military 
force. As the protests continued to become more organized and widespread, the military 
responded with increasingly violent force. As a result, the opposition also became 
increasingly violent with early militias joining the “Free Syrian Army (FSA),” founded 
by military defectors. The conflict has continued to spiral into chaos with a full-scale 
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III. ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT 
The baseline for peace and stability in any state begins with having a secure 
environment. A safe and secure environment can be defined as, “one in which the 
population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, 
persistent, or large-scale violence.”87 Without this sustainable environment, a society will 
struggle to perform even basic civic activities such as attending school or operating a 
business. Advanced activities often associated with post-conflict societies, such as 
restructuring state institutions or fostering a new rule of law, require a safe and secure 
environment for society to be actively engaged. 88  
A secure environment that offers a degree of public order for civil society to 
return to routine pre-war activities will depend on physical and territorial security. 
Physical security requires that “political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general 
population are free of fear from grave threats to physical safety.”89  Territorial security 
encompasses protecting the state from invasion, secure borders, and ensuring “people and 
goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to 
life and limb.”90  The termination of a military conflict does not automatically grant this 
security environment. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent reminders of how a post-conflict 
environment may become more dangerous to civilians than the actual armed conflict.91   
Attaining physical and territorial security requires both ending the large-scale 
violence and providing a measure of control over armed groups. This includes insurgents, 
criminals, leaders, and groups who perceive such a security environment as a threat to 
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their power, interests, or views. 92  These spoilers must be managed and small-scale 
violence contained from erupting into larger conflict. Violence is unlikely to disappear 
from any society, but reducing it to non-continuous sporadic events provides space for 
both civil society and the state to continue moving  an agreed upon end state.  
The initial objective then for a post-conflict state is to achieve physical and 
territorial security environment that ends large-scale violence, contains small-scale 
violence, and manages spoilers. How can a state best achieve these goals?  Like any 
conflict theory, there is no silver bullet that gives a perfect solution. What has worked 
one in country may have failed in another. If there were a universal blue print, states like 
Afghanistan and Libya would surely be following it. In examining how other states 
emerging from civil war have succeeded or failed in their endeavor to create a security 
environment, this chapter highlights three elements that make establishing and 
maintaining a security environment more likely to succeed: 
 Achieve a negotiated peace plan between the leaders of warring parties. 
 Obtain committed and capable international support. 
 Agree on a joint arms management plan. 
A. ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED PEACE PLAN BETWEEN WARRING 
PARTIES 
It is logical to contend that getting belligerents to agree to stop fighting is a step  
creating a security environment. Yet truces and cease-fires are not solutions by 
themselves to achieving long term peace and security. Historically, they have not even 
ended large-scale violence the majority of the time. From 1945–2009, war has recurred in 
57% of countries that experienced civil war. 93  Scholars primarily attribute the causes of 
civil war recurrence to be as a result of a government too weak to commit to a settlement, 
social grievances among rebels remain unmet, or that opportunity costs on either side 
favor renewed conflict.94  In order to achieve sustained peace, it is imperative that 
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warring parties carefully craft an agreed upon settlement with substance designed to 
address these potential pitfalls and lay the framework for a sustained secure environment. 
Ultimately, a civil conflict ensues as a result of at least one group upset with the 
status quo and using violence as a means of redress.95  When neither side can win 
militarily, the basis for a peace settlement revolves around some form of agreement for 
cessation of hostilities and address of grievances. Every conflict has its own unique 
context and often varying political, economic, or social grievances. It is not the goal of 
this chapter to survey the varying options and clauses for grievance addresses— rather to 
suggest that in addition to the basic peace settlement, three crucial elements best foster a 
security environment. These include: ensuring the peace agreement is signed by the 
leaders of armed forces (who can thus be held accountable), calling on international 
peacekeeping, and including a disarmament plan. 
A treaty between belligerent groups is naturally signed by its leaders. These 
leaders are assumed to have control of their armed forces and capable of issuing ceasefire 
or withdrawal orders that will be followed. Heads of state are often de-facto military 
leaders for the professional, structured state military. Rebel factions and militias are 
likely to be less structured, but still have someone at the top who gives orders. It is 
critical that all these warring leaders who control means of violence are brought to the 
negotiating table instead of figureheads with no impact to the security environment.96 
Capturing the signatures of war leaders does not guarantee sustainable peace in of itself, 
but it does help to shape the security environment by officially holding individuals 
accountable for the conduct of their respective forces.   
The risk of not including all belligerent parties in a peace settlement was 
highlighted by the 2008 Goma peace agreement between the Congolese government and 
rebels. Twenty-two armed rebel groups agreed to peace terms, but one of the most 
important factions, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), was not 
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party to the agreement.97  While the other rebel groups initially began to honor their 
ceasefire and withdraw forces, the FDLR continued to press attacks. As hostilities 
between the government and FDLR continued, other rebel groups then abandoned their 
peace commitments and resumed hostilities in order to avoid losing ground to the 
FDLR.98  This example also highlights the danger that a single powerful spoiler group 
can have if left in a position to sustain conflict. Armed groups must be included into the 
peace process or weakened quickly before sustained conflict entices other groups to 
derail from the peace process. 
It is also conducive to the security environment if belligerent leaders agree to call 
on international peacekeeping to support and enforce the peace terms.99  Involvement of 
international peacekeeping does not guarantee the success of sustained , but an unbiased 
third party can facilitate crucial roles in the mediation process by serving as an arbitrator, 
offering neutral security to both sides during negotiations, or by including experts to help 
draft a peace treaty.100  Even more important however, is the role that international 
peacekeepers can fill once the treaty is signed.  
Once leaders of government and rebel forces agree to end conflict in a civil war, a 
state of domestic anarchy is likely to exist. There is no dominant authority to regulate the 
actions of either state or rebel actors. Strong levels of hatred and distrust between armed 
groups may invite a prisoner’s dilemma situation where an actor can benefit by reneging 
on his or her peace agreements with any shift in power or perceived advantage.101  
Without a third party to observe and enforce a treaty, neither side may be willing to 
commit to the terms. The state has no reason to trust that rebels will commit to ending 
their military campaign once agreeing to concessions. They may instead take advantage 
of government troop withdrawals to capture critical locations and use it to leverage for 
                                                 
97 Sarah E. Kreps, “Why Does Peacekeeping Succeed or Fail? Peacekeeping in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone,” in Modern War and the Utility of Force, ed. Jan Angstrom et al. 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 14. 
98 Ibid., 10–12. 
99 Fores and Nooruddin, “Credible Commitment,” 3. 
100 Ibid., 21.  
101 Ibid., 4. 
 27 
more concessions. On the same hand, rebels have little incentive to trust that the state will 
honor its agreements. Government forces may instead wait until rebels have come out of 
hiding, begun to disarm, and then annihilate them.102  For these reasons, it is imperative 
that military leaders agree to call for an unbiased international actor to serve as a neutral 
authority capable of guaranteeing that “groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, 
and will promises will be kept (or at least they can ensure that groups will survive until a 
new government and a new national military is formed.)”103 
B. GAIN COMMITTED AND CAPABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
International peacekeeping is far from an end all solution for a state’s post-
conflict security situation. Peacekeeping forces do provide an ability to establish an 
immediate artificial security environment that facilitates cooperation between belligerent 
parties and allows them to follow through on their post-conflict commitments. When a 
negotiated settlement calls for international peacekeeping, there is less chance that a 
belligerent side will return to war. A statistical and empirical study revealed that “the risk 
of another war is significantly lower when peacekeepers are present than when 
belligerents are left on their own in the aftermath of war.”104  The study determined the 
risk of war recurrence was reduced by 55–60% in a state when peacekeepers were present 
at 75–85% less likely after their mission concludes.105  Additionally, interviews from 
various conflicts found strong support for peacekeeping as tool of stability from both 
government and rebel leaders.106 
International peacekeeping is a mixed bag. Many different countries participate 
for a variety of different reasons in international peacekeeping usually as part of an 
international organization such as the United Nations, European Union, African Union, or 
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NATO. Regardless of the patch worn, peacekeepers are ultimately representative of an 
individual state’s military personnel and equipment. Just as the political will and 
resources of contributing states are not equal, nor are the capabilities of its military 
forces. Ultimately, different political and military situations can set different 
peacekeeping requirements. The one constant in international peacekeeping is that a 
neutral authority must be viewed by all parties as a credible force that makes the costs of 
reneging on the peace terms much higher than any perceived benefit of cheating.107  This 
credibility is best achieved when a third party has a legitimate state interest in committing 
to the peace and also possesses the military capacity to signal resolve and punish either 
violating party.108 
An external state that takes on the hazardous role of a peacekeeping authority is 
ultimately risking its blood and treasure for the cause. A state is more likely to commit its 
resources in hostile environments if it views the peacekeeping as part of its national 
interests or security.109  Humanitarian concern is a voiced interest in the international 
community, but the strongest state interests have historically revolved around strategic 
interests, economic investments, security, alliance loyalties, or past colonial ties.110  
Without such a state self-interest at stake, peacekeeping commitment and perceived 
credibility may be vulnerable to the actions of spoilers who seek to undermine the peace 
process. This explains a number of failed peacekeeping operations in the 1990s that 
occurred in hostile environments with no ties to national interests. 111  Somalia is perhaps 
the most striking example. Despite a strong troop commitment of 25,000 U.S. and UN 
troops, the single 1993 engagement that cost the lives of 18 Americans in Mogadishu 
prompted an immediate end to the mission and withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from 
the region.112   
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State interest and the political will to commit to peacekeeping is not enough by 
itself to be perceived as credible. A neutral peacekeeping authority must also have the 
military capacity to project deterrence throughout the region and to attack groups that 
violate the treaty. A force will quickly lose credibility if it is concentrated in a few cities 
and can do nothing to prevent the atrocities raging in the countryside. This is one of the 
key problems hindering effective peacekeeping in Congo.113  Congo is nearly the size of 
Western Europe with much rugged terrain and little infrastructure. UN peacekeepers 
established a security environment around six urban areas where it conducts local patrols 
from. The vast majority of the country remains uncontrolled and any armed groups are 
free to operate as they wish with little threat of retribution.114   
In addition to having a peacekeeping force capable of projecting deterrence, the 
force should also be greater than either side’s armed forces. This provides credibility, as 
it is apparent that the neutral authority is capable of punishing a violating party.115  If for 
instance a state military has used advanced fighter jets and tanks against rebels, then a 
peacekeeping contingent of light infantry does not signal a resolve that is capable of 
protecting the rebels or attack the more powerful military if it resumes hostilities. If 
combatants do not feel that the peacekeeping force is capable or willing to protect them, 
they cannot be expected to lay down their arms.116 
The significance of military capacity in peacekeeping has been particularly 
emphasized throughout Africa. Africa is a continent full of civil wars, insurgents, and 
peacekeeping forces.117  The solution to long-term peace and security in this region 
according to the United States and other Western countries is for Africa to secure its own 
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region.118  Yet even if an African state perceives it is in its national interest to commit 
peacekeeping in a neighboring state, many simply lack the military capacity to achieve 
the mission. In a 2007 interview with the commander of the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS), General Martin Agwai lamented about lack of military equipment 
hindering his mission. 119  Insufficient armored personnel carriers and helicopters (no 
state had contributed a single one at the time) made even the most routine operations 
challenging. This included observing force movements, deploying troops, distributing 
aid, performing medical evacuations, or even accessing water that was often located 
miles away from the peacekeeping camps.120 [Despite the UN later joining the AU 
peacekeeping force, obtaining donor military equipment remains a challenge with only 
5 helicopters out of a minimum 24 requirement having been provided in 2011.121 ] 
A lack of military capacity not only undermines the credibility of a peacekeeping 
force but also provides an incentive for a stronger military to renege on peace terms. This 
proved to be the case for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 
1999. The initial UN peacekeeping force consisted of lightly-armed and poorly trained 
infantry units largely from India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia.122  The rebel 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) repelled UN attempts to seize RUF-controlled 
diamond mines and subsequently attacked the UN force, capturing 500 peacekeepers. 
This victory prompted a full renouncement of the ceasefire and led the RUF to advance 
on the capitol.123  Great Britain responded to these events of its former colony by 
intervening with the largest British taskforce since the Falklands. This included an 
aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, assault ship, 700 paratroopers, and 600 Royal Marines. 
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124  Within 5 weeks the country began to stabilize, the RUF was in full retreat, the UN 
redeployed with a stronger force, and a clear international signal of resolve was 
delivered. The ability to rapidly deploy advanced aircraft and elite infantry to stabilize a 
deteriorating situation required a military capacity well beyond the limits of the current 
peacekeepers.125  Britain left hundreds of its troops behind and utilized its short-term 
stability to assist the government in training its military, disarming the RUF rebels, and 
gain control over diamond mines. In 2005, the UN declared the mission a success.126   
C. INCLUDE A PLAN FOR ARMS MANAGEMENT. 
German sociologist Max Weber famously defined the state as the community that 
has a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. This definition is widely accepted and 
used as a measuring stick for modern governance.127  Thus, it is paramount for a 
government to control the armed forces within its borders as a natural prerequisite for 
state stability and order. But what about when a state has lost control and employs its 
military and security services against other internal armed groups?  This results in a 
challenging dichotomy. The state cannot be secure so long as there are independent 
armed forces occupying territory within its borders. In order to restore the monopoly of 
violence, it is an unavoidable requirement for these groups to disband and disarm.128  Yet 
to disband and disarm is for rebels to relinquish their means of protection and leverage, 
and to cede power to the very state forces that they’ve been fighting against. Therefore, in 
addition to the agreed upon political address of grievances, there must also include 
changes to the state security structure that ensures it will not attack them.129  These 
processes are traditionally broken into two categories: disarming, demobilizing, and 
reintegrating armed groups (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). 
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The importance of managing armed groups in a post-conflict society is crucial to 
fostering a secure and safe environment. DDR and SSR programs are recognized by the 
international community as essential elements to post-conflict peace building.130 If 
combatants do not turn in their arms and reintegrate in society through a DDR program, 
they may resume violence on a personal level or organize into gangs and challenge the 
new security institutions (which is likely to have a limited early capacity).131  If a SSR 
program fails to develop or gain credibility, people will find their security elsewhere 
including religious or ethnic-based militias. Also, territorial spaces that are out of the 
reach of a state’s security may offer safe havens for armed non-state actors that contribute 
to conflict and destabilization.132  This has proved to be one of the ongoing challenges in 
Afghanistan where Taliban and tribal leaders continue to administer security and justice 
in areas outside the reach of state security.133   
While it is easy to recognize the utility of DDR and SSR programs to affect a 
secure environment, formulating and implementing these programs has proven 
challenging. Both programs are extremely complex, volatile, and time and-resource-
intensive.134  After a negotiated peace settlement occurs, DDR and SSR programs are 
expected to reduce arms and craft an effective state security apparatus often in a society 
with no history of transparency or civilian oversight of armed forces. The police and 
judiciary may be weak or complicit in continuing violence.135  While fighters are 
expected to turn in their weapons, there is often heightened criminal activity and a 
general fear of oppression and injustice in post-conflict societies.136   
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Because the exact environment within each post-conflict state is unique, an 
equally unique arms management approach must be applied. Specifically, the interests of 
political and security elites, non-state actors, regional powers must be taken into 
account.137  These interests have resulted in a variety of arms management models 
occurring over the past three decades. Judging success or failures in each case is 
frustratingly a relative assessment from different experts, as there is no universal 
definition of success. For example, the UN’s DDR-SSR program in Liberia resulted in 
over 100,000 ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized (including 11,000 child soldiers). 
At the same time a large number of former combatants kept their arms, joined criminal 
groups, and remain heavily involved in illegal gold and diamond mining.138  Depending 
on an individual’s perspective, the case of Liberia could be considered a success or 
failure. Different agencies measure success against different objectives. Academics do 
not even agree on definitions for disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration.139  As 
one intrastate conflict scholar explained, “Despite years of practice in implementing DDR 
in a number of contexts, there remains little knowledge about whether it works, why it 
works, and its impacts on achieving broader-peace building goals.”140  
Arms management remains an evolving practice. Most current literature on DDR 
and SSR acknowledges the importance of pursuing a country-specific approach and 
focuses on a “lessons learned” for future operations.141  In places like Afghanistan, new 
strategies are continually adapted to changing circumstances. Because of this evolving 
nature and no set standard of measurement, it is difficult to clearly define variables that 
lead to success or failure. Yet it is widely acknowledged that both processes must happen 
in order to restore the state monopoly of legitimate violence.142  In surveying recent 
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literature in the DDR-SSR realm, two traits repeatedly stand out as recommendations for 
maximizing the efficiency of these programs. These include the importance of agreeing 
on the structure of an arms plan in the initial peace settlement and linking DDR and SSR 
planning together. 
Disarmament and reforming the security sector are critical piece of the security 
puzzle. Both processes are steps to a returning a war-torn country to a point of 
“normalcy” where the state controls the use of violence. There is no shortcut around this, 
and leaders of armed groups must be on board with an agreed upon plan. The leaders of 
Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) created a security plan in Libya 2011 on 
their own terms, with costly results. Initial security was officially outsourced to local 
militias while the NTC developed a security plan that incorporated most of the pre-
existing security forces into new police and military forces while limiting the militia to 25 
percent of the new force.143  Many of the militia perceived the high number of retained 
Qaddafi forces as a continuation of the old order, and refused to disarm or give up control 
of their lucrative security holdings (including ports, airports, and border terminals).144  
The same militias who brought down Qaddafi’s regime are now crippling the security 
environment and hindering the country from moving forward.  
Any DDR-SSR process is political and likely to be contentious on all sides. 
During peace negotiations, leaders with an interest in the outcome of peace are already 
debating, compromising, and setting the groundwork for their future country. This is the 
opportune entry point to agree on basic DDR and SSR principles.145 By including a plan 
to manage arms in the peace agreement, stakeholders are given an opportunity to address 
their interests and concerns and take joint ownership of security reform. If not included in 
the peace treaty, there is an increased chance of third party actor (such as the United 
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Nations, World Bank, donor governments, or NGOs) instituting a program for the 
country that is insensitive to the causes of insecurity and conflict between parties.146   
The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement proved to be one of the problems in 
Afghanistan where power brokers did not sign an agreement that included DDR-SSR.147  
This left the international community to attempt to manage the security and arms control 
of Afghanistan without a local perspective. The absence of an agreement by warring 
leaders to disarm and reintegrate also meant there was little leverage to enforce 
compliance or hold anyone accountable. As a result, disarmament largely took an 
assorted role of commanders negotiating different spot contracts with various 
commanders to disarm their militias independently.148  The DDR-SRR challenge in 
Afghanistan remains ongoing and has been well documented.149 
In the case of Burundi’s 2000 Arusha peace negotiations, both programs were  
an integral part of the peace planning. Because the military was historically used as  
a way for the Tutsi elite to dominate the Hutu majority, defense reform was a priority  
for the Hutu groups during the outset of the negotiations.150  Initially, rebel groups 
demanded the Tutsie-led Forces Armees Burundaises be completely disbanded and a new 
national military created. The government wanted the rebel groups to disperse and 
disarm. As a compromise, both sides agreed to integrate rebel groups into the current 
security apparatus without requiring disarmament first.151  The sides then agreed on a 
mechanism restructure security through joint committees and commissions empowered 
with specific mandates such as an Implementation Monitoring Committee, Joint  
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Ceasefire Commission, and National Commission on Demobilization, Reinsertion, and 
Reintegration.152  In 2009, a second process began after the final armed group still at war 
agreed to peace.153 
DDR and SSR share the same objective of “consolidating the state’s monopoly of 
force so that it may enforce the rule of law.”154  Neither can succeed without the other. 
The two are also linked operationally, as many ex-combatants will work in the new 
security forces that come from SSR.155  Despite these similarities, many agencies and 
scholars treated the two as separate functions in the past. The UN’s Inter-Agency 
Working Group on DDR and the Inter-Agency SSR Task Force both comprise twenty-
one entities yet overlap on only ten, with different people from the same agencies 
sometimes assigned to each group.156  This is due in large part to the differences in 
metrics. An agency can measure DDR by the numbers of combatants demobilized and 
disarmed, how many and what types of weapons collected, or how many ex-combatants 
are receiving reintegration funding.157  This can be achieved faster and is more tangible 
to measure than to what degree the state security structures are being reformed to provide 
“an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian 
authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.”158   
The nature of DDR and SSR programs involve different actors with different 
activities and short-term objectives.159  These differences often lead policy makers to 
treat the processes separately. Independent approaches often yield the unintended 
consequences of separate, disjointed plans, diverse methods of evaluation, and different 
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sources/levels of funding support.160  All of these represent potential stumbling blocks 
for each program. As discussed, neither DDR nor SSR can succeed without the other. To 
thus maximize the chance for each program to achieve success, numerous academics 
advise conceiving and implementing the two as one process in an integrate approach.161  
By integrating the approach, a mutual plan between the various actors creates a 
shared vision of the security sector. This offers the basic starting point for DDR 
decisions, shapes the long-term goal for SSR, and ensures all actors are working within a 
framework of a shared plan.162  This concept is relatively new in the academic world and 
repeatedly emphasized by scholars from a lessons-learned perspective. But the same 
scholars stop short of designing different constructs and instead conclude that each 
integrated approach to DDR-SSR will vary based on the political concerns and agendas 
of elites and ex-combatants of a particular country.163  There remains much room for the 
academia community to continue to developing this concept further. None the less, the 
fact that linking DDR-SSR programs together as part of broader development strategy is 
recognized by current experts in the field, still offers a critical planning point for 
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IV. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
Democracy is the most common form of government in the world today.165  
Regime changes continue to be associated with democratic transition, as evidenced by 
recent attempts at regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. These 
states also highlight the fact that changing a government is a complex process that can 
negatively impact society. When society is split among ethnic lines, the dangers are 
multiplied. A study of ethnic conflicts between 1990–1998 revealed that the majority 
occurred in states that were moving  democratization with violence tending to erupt a 
year after an improvement in civil or political liberties.166   
A popular theory for the democratization increasing risk of conflict is tied to elite 
manipulation on nationalism. Often nationalism is weak or non-existent in states under 
authoritarian rule and elites pursuing democratic power can create or manipulate an 
ethnic national identity that appeals to their group while appearing divisive to others.167  
In recognizing that democracy is both the form of government most likely to be pursued 
by a state emerging from authoritarianism today and that the process brings an increased 
risk of national conflict, the challenge for a democratizing state is to adapt a system 
where elites cannot use democracy as an instrument for ethnic division.  
Scholars agree that democratic transitions should proceed carefully in divided 
societies, but differ on what form of democracy is best. Democracies come in all different 
shapes and sizes. There are many ways to examine political engineering including by 
constitutional design or electoral process. This chapter examines democracies through 
how political power is structured. Political power is the weapon through which elites can 
strengthen or divide the citizenry. There is no conclusive way to prove that a certain 
structure would best limit ethnic conflict in a state. Some may be better suited for 
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different environments. Instead, mechanisms for power consolidation, sharing, and 
division are examined along with supporting evidence and their critiques.  
A. POWER CONSOLIDATION 
Consolidating political power is a strategy that seeks to concentrate power with 
the majority elect. This is commonly referred to as majority or popular rule.168  Under 
this system, people are free to make their interests known, engage in politics, and 
ultimately elect winner-take-all representatives to govern according to the consent of the 
majority. Proponents of this view believe that this system is the best way to “maximize 
the possibility for individual self-determination.”169   
Under a winner-take-all majority rule, power is consolidated more quickly as 
leaders enforce political decisions without having to debate with or face veto concerns 
from other parties sharing power. This allows the state to respond to challenges more 
efficiently by enacting policies much more quickly. In theory, this includes the threat of a 
growing ethnic divide. Additionally, Timothy Meisburger argues that a majority system 
reduces the risk of extremism rising in new democracies because minority groups are not 
guaranteed to gain access to political power. Instead, parties must appeal to the masses 
and win the median voters, as opposed to a small extremist or patronage network.170   
Critics of majoritarian democracy often of cite the potential dangers of a “tyranny 
of the majority.” While the government is able consolidate power more quickly, it can 
also ignore minority demands or pressure the group to fall in line with the majority.171  
Often the restraints on majority power lay in a legal or constitutional apparatus that can  
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be overturned or amended with a majority approval.172  This leaves the minority with 
little protection from the consolidated government or a strong cause to participate if their 
group is guaranteed to be shut out.   
An example of this danger is highlighted with Macedonia after the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. Macedonia developed a majoritarian democracy in a state divided by the 
majority Macedonians and minority ethnic Albanians.173  The Albanians participated in 
politics but were constantly outvoted by the majority Macedonians on issues that 
mattered to the Albanian people such as having a bilingual state.174  This left many 
Albanians feeling marginalized by the political system. Despite having individual rights 
protected by a constitution, many felt their cultural rights were not. When the 
Macedonian Assembly denied a proposal for Albanians to place their ethnic Albanian 
flag alongside the Macedonian flag on holidays, thousands of Albanians began rioting, 
two protesters were killed, and an armed insurgence ensued in 2001.175   
B. POWER SHARING 
Power sharing models were devised as an alternative to the winner-take-all 
majoritarian systems. Under this system, power sharing is institutionalized through rules 
that guarantee inclusive decision making.176 With regard to divided societies, the most 
prevalent model of power sharing is consociationalism and the integrative approach. 
Proponents of these models argue that majoritarian democracies might work under 
conditions in a homogeneous population, but not when societies have “a legacy of bitter 
and bloody civil wars, factional strife, or inter-community violence, and in transitional  
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post-authoritarian states.177  In such divided societies, arrangements must be made to 
secure the role of minorities in government in order to avoid disenfranchisement and 
ethnic conflict.178 
The integrative approach to power shower was conceived by Michael Horowitz in 
1985. Under his approach an electoral system would be structured to encourage moderate 
elites to rule with the interests of minority. Voters would vote on their second and third 
preferences and winning an election would require a majority of first and second votes in 
a number regions, forcing candidates to appeal to minority groups and form coalitions 
that they could otherwise afford to ignore.179  Horowitz’s ideas are largely theoretical as 
Fiji offered the only country to utilize alternative voting with powersharing. While this 
approach is often mentioned in power sharing literature, it appears to have little academic 
support.180 
Consociational democracy is the most common method of power-sharing, first 
championed by Arrend Lijphart in 1969. Since then Lijphart has continued to author 
literature advocating for a consociational democracy that includes: elites sharing 
executive power in a grand coalition, granting autonomy to ethnic groups to govern their 
own internal affairs, having a minority veto on significant issues, and having a 
proportionality representation in parliament.181  Of these, the grand coalition and cultural 
autonomy are most important.182  Lijphart cites his evidence with a study of 36 different 
countries that revealed statistically significant evidence that consensual democracies that 
share power had less violence than majoritarian democracies.183   
                                                 
177 Pippa Norris, “Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-Sharing 
Institutions Work,” Harvard University paper for presentation at International Studies Association 46th 
annual convention, Honolulu (March 5, 2005), 5. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Rothchild and Roeder, “Power Sharing Impediment,” 32–33. 
180 Lijphart, Thinking Democracy, 77. 
181 Arend Lijphart, “The Power Sharing Approach,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic 
Societies ed. Joseph Montville, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990) 491–510. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy 2nd Edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 
272. 
 43 
Critics of consociationalism are quick to point that Lijphart’s ideas are relevant to 
European systems. Not only is most of his original data drawn for European countries, 
but countries in Lijphart’s models all have a history of democratic experience.184  
By institutionalizing power sharing in an ethnically divided society, the divisive ethnic 
identities are reified as parties are shaped along ethnic or religious lines.185 This often 
means elites in power treat all issues as ethnic issues and are more likely to pursue 
policies that unify their ethnic group and resist any that could divide.186 
While recognizing that there are many variations of the power sharing models, the 
empirical record of ethnic power sharing as a whole remains questionable. 
Czechoslovakia’s power sharing resulted in partition. Cyprus and Lebanon underwent 
civil wars and remain strongly divided today. Widespread ethnic conflict in Malaysia 
ended its consociational government. Fiji had a military coup. South Africa transitioned 
to majoritarianism.187  A detailed statistical study of 103 regimes between 1972–2003 
offered little support for power sharing as proportional representation was associated with 
higher levels of political violence, federalism was inconclusive, and combining 
consociationalist institutions was also associated with higher levels of violence.188  New 
power-sharing governments such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, 
Afghanistan, or Iraq appear largely paralyzed to make major policies across ethnic lines.  
C. POWER DIVIDING 
Power dividing is a strategy designed specifically as an alternative to power 
sharing. This approach argues for dividing power among multiple majorities to make 
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decisions. Proponents of this approach claim that instead of locking in ethnic differences 
with institutional guarantees or minority veto power, power dividing deemphasizes 
ethnicity and promotes what Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild call a “nation state 
stewardship.”189  This is achieved through dispersing different power throughout 
alternative subgroups with shared interests that cross-cut majorities and minorities. For 
instance, one group is responsible for deciding education budgets another is responsible 
for setting interest rates, another on determining water allocation from a river basin, etc. 
Additionally, checks and balances prevent any majority group from dominating another 
group. This reduces the change that winners and losers correlate around ethnicity.190  
Instead, members of ethnic groups recognized their shared interests in defending the 
institutional order and any attempt to exclude an ethnic minority is likely to bring support 
from elements of the ethnic majority.191  
As evidence to support power sharing, Roeder cites strong statistical evidence 
examining ethno-national crises and armed conflict from 153 states and 658 ethnic 
groups over 5-year periods from 1955–1999.192  He concluded that “power dividing is 
less likely than power sharing to see the stakes in normal ethno-political conflict escalate 
to ethno-national crises, and it is less likely to see escalation to more extreme means.”193  
Equally interesting, Roeder and Lijphart both cite several of the same empirical examples 
as evidence to support their own models. For example, to Lijphart India “is almost perfect 
example of consociational democracy, exhibiting all four of its characteristics in clear 
and thorough fashion.”194  Roeder also claims India as an example of power dividing and 
that “India’s ethnic stability… appears to be a result of avoiding the concentration of 
institutional weapons in the hands of ethnic leaders.”195 
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Aside from the debates of case selection, several other criticisms exist. To begin 
with, power dividing requires a developed civil society with elites existent in a range of 
fields and in multiple ethnic groups. If a state is war torn with a weak civil society, how 
effective can a multiple majorities group be in effecting policy?  Crafting such a system 
is also an advanced legal undertaking with careful checks and balances between groups to 
prevent a majority group from dominating others. If the current justice system is corrupt 
or dysfunctional, it must first be addressed somehow before this system will work. 
Roeder and Rothchild even recognize that power-dividing is a long term solution and that 
initial power sharing may be more beneficial for ethnic groups to agree on a peace 
settlement or “for one-time, pump-priming decisions, such as the initial staffing of new 
bureaucracies.”196   
Ethnic partition is another option that many be considered a physical division of 
power into separate states. Most scholars consider partition as a last resort to end ethnic 
violence when no other solution is possible. Chaim Kauffman concludes that there can 
then only be three ends to an ethnic war: complete victory by one side, temporary 
suppression, or by physical separation of the groups that reduces incentives and 
opportunity for further hostility.197 Kauffman further argues that ethnic identities are 
hardened over time to a point where cross-ethnic political cooperation is nearly 
impossible. Particularly when violence has reached such a high level that ethnic groups 
identify an entire other ethnic group as an enemy, and perpetuate rumors and stories to 
fuel that belief. At this point, partition may be the best option. 198 Kauffman cites both 
empirical evidence of unchanged public feelings such as the Kurds in Turkey, Tamils in 
Sri Lanka, or Serbs in Bosnia, and a statistical argument from a data set of 27 ethnic civil 
wars between 1944–1994 that resulted in only eight ending by an agreement that did not 
include partition.199   
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Critics of partition also cite their own evidence as to the ineffectiveness of 
keeping peace after partition. A study by Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl 
found no significant correlation supporting partition as successful to limiting war 
recurrence. Even after adding different controls and removing potentially ambiguous data 
cases, the results did not change.200  They discovered “the main predictors of a return to 
war are local capacities: higher per capita income and income growth reduce the risk of 
another war, whereas dependence on primary commodities increases it.”201  The authors 
then theorize that partition may increase the chance for violence by adding territorial 
disputes, creating new ethnic divides, or weakening economic position of the rump state, 
but may also succeed under a particular set of circumstances.202  Jack Snyder points to 
partitioning’s limited historical effectiveness (including the increased ethnic violence 
after partitioning in India and Pakistan) while advising that partitioning is not a preferred 
strategy but it should be fully excluded.203  Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild also 
agree that partitioning is not a preferred solution to end civil wars in an ethnically divided 
society unless the two sides cannot agree to even co-exist with one another and it is 
therefore impossible for ethnic groups to live together in a democracy.204   
D. TAKEAWAYS 
Building a democracy in a divided post-conflict society is a monumental 
challenge. Despite dozens of case studies and volumes of literature, there is no agreed on 
method. As the power consolidating majoritarian systems of Europe struggled to take 
hold in former colonial states, power-sharing approaches were developed. As these 
models continue to struggle, new theories in power dividing are being written in 
response.   
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Each approach has its merits and drawbacks. Consolidation allows for a more 
government efficiency with faster decision-making ability, yet risks marginalizing the 
minority. Power sharing limits the threat of “tyranny of the majority” and gives minority 
assurances, but also reifies ethnicities and threatens to immobilize a government. Power 
dividing limits ethnic differences and promotes civil society driving the decision making 
process but is an advanced system requiring careful legal design and difficult to reach 
immediately in a post-conflict environment. Partition may or may not be a favorable 
solution to ending ethnic wars.  
In arguing for a particular approach, many academics offer data sets and empirical 
case studies. Many of these data sets counter each other and case studies often overlap 
depending on an individual’s interpretation and classification. Clearly, no scholar has 
proven a superior model. The individual context of a divided state, including as the nature 
the minority and degree of violence, may be better indicators of which models are 
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V. FINDING RECONCILIATION 
Post-conflict reconciliation is a grey subject matter. In surveying post-conflict 
literature, reconciliation is often a neglected subject, especially compared to the vast 
literature on security or democratic engineering. One likely explanation is the difficulty 
in measuring reconciliation. How does one quantify such an emotional and subjective 
idea?  Reconciliation is too intangible to construct an index measurement table and 
perform scientific studies on. Social attitude surveys are perhaps the closest methodology 
to assessing the progress of reconciliation. Yet only one country (South Africa) maintains 
a dedicated social survey process to measure the reconciliation process.205  Even the 
nature of reconciliation is uncertain, as some believe it to be the process of reaching the 
conclusion and others the end-state in itself where relationships of trust exist.206 For the 
sake of discussion, this chapter uses the broad definition of reconciliation to be “the act of 
building or rebuilding relationships today that are not haunted by the conflicts and 
hatreds of yesterday.”207  Despite these challenges in definition and measurement, many 
recognize the reconciliation, however interpreted, plays a significant role rebuilding a 
post-conflict society.208   
Wars are nasty by nature. When the war is a civil war with a long history of state-
sponsored atrocities, it is brutal on all of society that leaves the country traumatized.209  
A peace agreement may end major hostilities and promise a redress for the root cause of 
the conflict, but it will not erase the memories or feelings of victims that suffered as a 
result of repression and abuse. People do not forget atrocities committed against family, 
friends, and neighbors—nor do they forget that people somewhere caused these 
injustices. When a conflict is divided on ethnic lines, widespread hatred and distrust 
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between groups can sharpen pre-existing divides and keep the threat of an ethnic war on 
the horizon. A state that emerges from conflict in such a position is faced with the 
decision to pursue a reconciliation approach that seeks to limit these divides, or to go 
forward in peace and let the past rest. This is not cut and clear choice. 
Choosing to pursue policies of reconciliation is a risk-reward calculus. To 
reconcile with victims is a “costly repentance” process that requires truthful 
acknowledgement of wrongdoings and giving justice in the form of some degree of 
accountability.210  These very acts however, may threaten the peace and stability and of 
the state. Recounting horrific experiences and bringing truth into the open is likely to 
resurface feelings of pain and anger in victims, setting high expectations for 
accountability. If these expectations are unmet, desire for state justice may turn into 
demand for personal retribution. Also, the former leaders and combatants who face 
justice may instead return to violence as an alternative to prosecution.211  On the other 
side of the coin, a successful reconciliation process may help to “ease the burning 
memory of torture suffered or massacres witnessed… [for] society as a whole… to move 
on, to recreate a livable space of national peace, build some form of reconciliation 
between enemies, and secure these events in the past.”212   
A. WHY RECONCILIATION? 
There is no formula for when a reconciliation process should or should not be 
risked. The United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
acknowledges that this process is not meant for every country, and then offers a loose 
criterion for when a country is “ripe.” 213  This occurs when a state has the political will 
to support a serious inquiry, the conflict has ended, and there is an interest for victims and 
                                                 
210 Nicholas Fraying, “ the Healing of History: an Exploration of the Relationship Between Pardon 
and Peace,” in Reconciliation(s) Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies ed. Joanna Quinn (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s Press, 2009), 30–34. 
211 Severine Autessere, “Peacetime Violence,” Program on States and Security. Accessed 26 January, 
2013. http://www.statesandsecurity.org/_pdfs/Autesserre.pdf.  
212 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths (New York: Routledge, 2011), 3–4.  
213 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Rule-of-Law Tools 
for Post-Conflict States (New York: United Nations Publications, 2009), 4–5. 
 51 
witnesses to partake in an investigation.214  Each state is ultimately responsible to make 
its own calculated decision as to whether or not reconciliation measures will aid or hinder 
peace. Perhaps the persecution was not severe enough to solidify widespread resentment 
or maybe the state emerged victorious over a small opposition group that can easily be 
crushed if they resort to vengeful actions. One may logically deduct that the importance 
of conducting post-conflict reconciliation process is associated with the degree of human 
rights violations committed. 
Reconciliation is a long-range effort. No policy will change years of bitterness 
and hate or ethnic divides overnight. What reconciliation can offer is a mechanism that 
limits the divides from growing. Allowing victims to tell their stories, having an official 
acknowledgement of past atrocities and offering justice is the start of repairing 
relationships between groups in society.215  South Africa began a reconciliation process 
nearly two decades ago. And while the country made a peaceful transition to democracy 
and no longer has widespread atrocities, racial barriers between blacks and white 
remain.216  This begs the question of why a state should invest time and resources in such 
an endeavor that may not yield tangible results for years. 
The strongest argument for the importance of pursuing post-conflict reconciliation 
is with the empirical evidence of divided states that buried their past and moved on. 
South Africa may still have racial divides, but the country is not unstable, does not 
require UN peacekeepers to monitor groups, and is not volatile to an ethnic war breaking 
out. Bosnia and Lebanon cannot make the same claims, as each country ignored 
reconciliation after their civil wars between ethnic groups.  
As a neighbor of Syria and comprised of many of the same ethnic groups, 
Lebanon offers perhaps the most valuable example of the cost of ignoring reconciliation. 
After a 15-year civil war in Lebanon, the state chose to ignore justice and reconciliation 
entirely and pursue peace through power sharing arrangements. An amnesty law 
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pardoned all political crimes prior to the war, creating a widespread sense of injustice.217  
Also, because the state never performed an investigation into the causes and crimes 
during the war, there is no “official” truth or even a common curriculum to teach 
students. Different versions of the civil war perpetuate among the different religious 
groups deepening the sectarian tensions.218  It is worth noting that there are civil society 
groups and NGOs in Lebanon that are trying to counter this through measures such as 
arranging exchange trips between Christian and Muslim students.219  These efforts are 
small in the overall wounds of Lebanon society however. Strong levels of distrust and 
intolerance between religious groups perpetuates instability and creates a continuous “keg 
of gunpowder” situation where a renewed civil war is never far off.220  No one can say 
for certain that a reconciliation process would alleviate these problems, but it is difficult 
to envision the process doing worse for Lebanon. 
In absence of any reconciliation measuring system or tangible data, the 
reconciliation process will always be a grey subject. It is important to recognize however 
that the process is important in divided post-conflict societies. No country wants to be a 
Bosnia or Lebanon. States have historically pursued reconciliation through a variety of 
approaches centered on truth and justice. Because of the previously discussed problems 
with measurement, the best methods of examining reconciliation strategies is to survey 
these approaches for insights and future lessons learned. This may be an unscientific 
approach, but such is the business of reconciliation. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies are examined where each country had a government-
initiated attempt at reconciliation after a period civil war. These specific countries were 
chosen to examine a range of different reconciliation approaches in different regions. The 
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attempt is not to “cherry pick” case studies to support any theory or to claim any 
universal model in achieving reconciliation. Indeed the author does not even claim that 
any of these reconciliation measures were successful or not. It is obvious however, that 
some measures have achieved more positive and negative results than others. The goal 
then is to examine a range of reconciliation efforts and search for overlapping indicators 
of success or failure.   
1. Peru 
Peru is a state with a long post-colonial history of authoritarian rule. In 1980, the 
ruling military dictatorship was challenged by the Maoist insurgency group known as the 
Shining Path. Two years later, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement also 
challenged the government.221  Over the course of the next two decades the Peruvian 
government and these rebel groups fought a bitter war that witnessed mass 
disappearances, murders, tortures, and an assortment of human rights abuses on both 
sides. In November of 2000, a new government came to power and actively supported a 
truth commission to discover the truth.222 
Twelve members were appointed by the government with a mandate to 
“investigate human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law attributable to the 
state or to ‘terrorist organizations’.”223 The commission was given a budget of 
$13 million for two years that was used to hire a 500 person staff and travel throughout 
the countryside holding public statements The group also worked closely with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, and 
the Human Rights Coordinating Committee of NGO’s to locate missing family members 
and assist in exhumation efforts.224  In total, 17,000 statements were taken, and the  
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commission determined that 69,280 people were killed or disappeared—a number 35,000 
more than the previous estimate. Four thousand six hundred secret graves were also 
discovered.225 
The commission’s final report was considered controversial by many former 
military and political leaders. Several members of the committee continued to receive 
death threats for years.226  The government has slowly enacted many of the truth 
commissions’ recommendations including the creation of a National Registry for 
Displaced People and legislation of a reparations policy. In 2004, a special human rights 
court was established that has tried death squads and key individuals such as a former 
president and national security chief.227  Prosecutions continue at a slow, showing a 
cautious sign of progress. The past two presidents of Peru however do raise questions as 
one ruled during the government’s brutal counterinsurgency in the 1980s and the other 
who was implicated in murder and torture.228 
2. South Africa 
From 1948 to 1994, South Africa was an apartheid state where whites dominated 
all aspects of the states. The roots of racial segregation against black South Africans trace 
back to colonization with the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 organizing marginal native 
“homelands” for blacks while permitting whites to control 87% of the country.229  These 
areas were not democratic but ruled by traditional chiefs with increased powers, thus 
giving them an interest to preserve the system. Blacks that left their “homeland” to serve 
as cheap labor in white-controlled business and industries were afforded no political or 
economic opportunities.230  Public services were segregated between whites and blacks. 
Any opposition to the apartheid system was met with a stern security force that killed 
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over 18,000, detained 80,000, and tortured 6,000 during the apartheid.231  
Demonstrations and protests grew more hostile, culminating in terrorism against the 
white population of South Africa in the mid-90s by anti-apartheid groups. When the first 
national democratic elections were held in 1994, a strong level of enmity between ethnic 
groups existed.232 
One of the first actions for the newly elected South African government was to 
develop a truth and reconciliation committee. Much time and energy was devoted to the 
exploring a method, including members traveling to international conferences, soliciting 
inputs from civil society, and hundreds of hours of discussion in hearings.233  Finally, in 
1995, parliament passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
whereby a commission was charged with a mandate to investigate human rights 
violations that occurred from 1960 until the election. A diverse 17-person commission 
was selected through a process of public nominations, government-civil society 
screening, before finally being selected by President Mandela.234  The commission 
received a budget of over $18 million for the first two years and divided into three 
committees: the human rights violation, amnesty, reparations and rehabilitations 
committee. Finally, the commission was given the legal power to “grant individualized 
amnesty, search premises and seize evidence, subpoena witnesses, and run a sophisticated 
witness-protection program.”235   
The commission collected over 21,000 personal testaments from witnesses and 
victims. Two thousand of these were handpicked to give their account in a public hearing. 
In an effort to maintain the perception of impartiality and legitimacy with white South 
Africans, non-black victims were purposely over represented in its public hearings.236  
This decision was one of several that led many to accuse the commission of valuing 
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reconciliation over truth. Other examples include the commission failing to issue 
subpoena or search orders against important organizations and leaders such as the South 
African Defense Headquarters, Minister of Home Affairs, or the Freedom party 
president.237 
On the matter of finding justice, the commission adopted a “truth for amnesty” 
policy. This was a middle ground that met the African National Congress’ demand for 
accountability and the former National Party’s fear of retributive justice.238  The criteria 
for amnesty were that an individual admit their crimes and demonstrate that they were 
politically motivated and not out of “personal malice, ill will, or spite.”239  This position 
depended on individuals coming forward on their own accord to testify or risk being 
discovered, subpoenaed, and prosecuted without chance for amnesty. However, few 
subpoenas were sent and early key trials such as that of the former minister of defense 
ended in acquittal. This quickly set a weak tone for the threat of prosecution. While many 
senior leaders ignored the offer, ultimately 1,167 individuals did receive amnesty in 
return for providing detailed information that helped to fill five volumes of the overall 
apartheid truth.240 
3. Liberia 
Liberia has historically been an unstable state. The indigenous peoples were 
oppressed for 130 years under a minority rule of ‘Americo-Liberians’—descendants of 
the repatriated settler slaves from North America in 1847.241  In 1980, a military coup 
brought the first indigenous leader to power in the form of Samuel Doe, but state 
repression continued. In 1989, Charles Taylor led brutal civil war that resulted in two 
hundred thousand killed and over a million displaced.242  Fourteen separate peace 
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accords were attempted from 1990–1996 before Charles Taylor was elected president in 
1997. In 1999, a second civil war kicked off against Charles Taylor’s regime until 2003. 
As part of the comprehensive peace agreement, the government and two rebel groups 
agree to hold a truth and reconciliation commission “to provide a forum that will address 
issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetuators of 
human rights violations to share their experiences.”243 
Initially, 9 members were appointed by the transitional government without 
consultation with other concerned parties. This led to strong objections and a two-year 
process to agree on a selection panel to vet members.244  After replacing 7 of the original 
9 commissioners, the Truth and Reconciliation Act gave the commission the mandate to 
investigate human rights abuses from January 1979-October 2003.245  The commission 
had the full power to subpoena and limited power to recommend amnesty.246 
Liberia’s commission traveled throughout the country collecting statements from 
20,560 Liberian victims. This included over 1,600 diaspora statements in the United 
States, Great Britain, and Ghana collected by the non-profit NGO Advocates for Human 
Rights. This marked the first time a truth commission partnered with an overseas group to 
aid in collecting statements.247  The commission also worked with the California non-
profit organization Benetech to construct a database to collect and corroborate victims’ 
stories. This helped craft a lengthy report accounting for 93,322 victims with 163,615 
violations including 28,000 killings and 6,000 rapes.248 
By most accounts, the Liberian truth commission did an admirable job in 
journeying the country, documenting history, and forming a national narrative.249  
Achieving justice proved to be controversial. Much to the public’s popularity, the 
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commission named over 150 individuals to be prosecuted and dozens of others that 
should to be banned from public office. Many of these individuals were already holding 
positions in all branches of the new government, including the current President Johnson 
Sirleaf.250  Further complicating the commission’s recommendations was an unclear 
process for their recommendations. For instance, 40 individuals recommended to be 
barred from office were not listed anywhere else in the report or given evidence for their 
crimes.251  President Sirleaf admitted she gave Charles Taylor political support in the 
past and had cut ties when she realized Taylor’s intentions. She was accused of not being 
honest enough and thus placed on the recommended banned list.252  On the other side, 
General Joshua Blahyi (more famously known as General Butt Naked) admitted to killing 
thousands and was granted a full reprieve for his cooperation.253 
The report of the group proved far too politically controversial for any meaningful 
accountability. Groups of warlords that were named on the report united together to 
publicly denounce the commission and threatened to return to arms. Any support of the 
commission could potentially destabilize the entire country, prompting the United 
Nations and the majority of the international community to take a neutral stance.254  
Foreign experts claimed the list of names was “utterly arbitrary” as the Liberian 
government enacted legislation to amend the “binding nature” of the truth commission’s 
recommendations.255  Today accused perpetrators of human rights crimes continued to be 
elected to Liberia’s government and there remains an ongoing campaign to completely 
shelve the commission’s report.256 
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4. Rwanda 
Rwanda is one of the most ethnically divided states in the world between its Hutu 
and Tutsi population. Academics debate the nature of ethnicity between these groups and 
make a strong argument that the groups are more of a class distinction.257  Both groups 
share the same language, similar culture, live together, and intermarry. The majority of 
Tutsi were herdsman while Hutus tended to be farmers.258  Under colonization by 
German and then Belgian authorities, the Tutsi were considered more intelligent and thus 
given preferential treatment and positions of power. In 1993–34, the Belgians performed 
a census and issued ethnic identification cards to each individual based on the amount of 
cattle owned.259  These ID cards created separate national identities that entrenched 
ethnic divisions.260  
This ethnic identification system was kept after independence and divisions 
continued to grow. New Hutu elites crafted the Rwanda state for their group, by 
excluding Tutsis from positions in government and the military while also enforcing a 
quota system that limited Tutsi access to state jobs or education.261  The Tutsi people 
became the scape goat to any shock to the state. This included increased poverty that 
resulted after the international price of coffee dropping in 1985 or after the 1990 invasion 
of Rwanda from the Uganda-based Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).262  In the early 
1990s, the government came under increased international pressure to democratize and 
allow free elections. At the same time, the Hutu elites in power were faced with mass 
discontent over “widespread corruption, geographical exclusion, [and] disappointment 
with the slow pace of development.”263  Ethnicity was the single issue that united the 
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majority Hutu people, and the government continued to utilize the ethnicity card. 
Newspapers, radio stations, and political rallies became a forum to vilify Tutsi, demand 
their deaths, and threaten people that supported them. From 1990–1993, thousands of 
Tutsi were imprisoned or killed by local mobs organized by authorities and politicians.264  
In April of 1994, the President of Rwanda’s plane was shot down, sparking off a full-
scale genocide against the Tutsi. In 100 days, between 800,000–1,000,000 Tutsi and 
sympathetic Hutus were killed. Sexual violence was committed to at least 250,000 
women with an estimated 70% of survivors infected with HIV.265  
Faced with a devastated population, the new Rwandan government rejected 
various truth and reconciliation models. Instead, the government focused on delivering 
justice above all. Reconciliation would be possible with the victims and the innocent once 
the guilty were punished.266  International donors funded over 100 justice-related projects 
that include a range of activities from building prisons and courthouses, establishing 
formal justice procedures, and training lawyers and judges. In 1996, the Rwandan 
National Assembly established a genocide law that created four categories of crime 
ranging from genocide (category I) to property offences (category IV).267  The new 
justice system was overwhelmed by the sheer number of trials. Over 130,000 persons 
were arrested and imprisoned for crimes relating to the Apr-Jul genocide. At the rate of 
early trials, more people were dying in prisons each year than were receiving trials.268  
In 2000, the Rwanda National Assembly passed legislation that paved the way for 
an innovative justice system known as the Gacaca Courts. Under the Gacaca system, 
prisoners accused of category I crimes would continue with the official state justice 
system. Everyone else would face a decentralized tribunal in the local community where 
                                                 
264 Ibid., 109–110. 
265 Hauschildt, “Gacaca Courts.” 
266 Peter Uvin, “The Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda,” in Reconciliation After Violent Conflict, ed. 





the prisoner is accused to have committed a crime.269  The community was then required 
to turn out to “discuss the alleged act or acts, provide testimony and counter-testimony, 
argument and counter-argument.”270  Nineteen community members were then elected to 
be a jury while one of the 255,000 previously elected and trained Gacaca judges presided 
over the case. Prisoners were encouraged to confess their crimes and ask forgiveness 
from the community to receive a reduced sentence.271   
The Gacaca courts closed in 2009. Since then, there has been much research, 
interviews, and studies performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the courts. Depending 
on the method of measurement, evaluations vary. With regard to reconciliation between 
Tutsi and Hutu, ethnic divisions appear to have deepened with a single-sided justice 
system.272. Gacaca courts were limited to investigating only the crimes committed during 
the 100 day genocide period. Any crimes committed by the RPF forces (led by Rwanda’s 
current President) against Hutu civilians or reprisal attacks after the genocide were 
strictly prohibited.273  This left a natural feeling of unfairness among the Hutu. 
Furthermore, anyone who criticized the Gacaca process was accused of having a 
“genocidal ideology.” 274  Even international human rights groups were forced to suspend 
operations for questioning the court process.275 The number of accusations for crimes 
related to genocide rapidly grew to encompass over 1 million people—nearly half of the 
entire Hutu male population in 1994.276  This implies a sense of collective blame on the 
entire Hutu group as opposed to individuals. The strong coercive role that the government  
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played throughout the Gacaca process has prompted some scholars to argue that “the 
Gacaca courts have been a tool of fear and control for an authoritarian regime under the 
guise of seeking justice.”277  
5. Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka presents an intriguing case study on two grounds. First, their 
reconciliation process represents the most recent state attempt, beginning in 2009. Also 
unique, is that the war ended without a negotiated settlement, but a complete military 
victory by the ethnic majority over the minority. The resulting reconciliation process that 
followed is easily the most criticized of any of our case studies, yet that should not 
exclude an attempt at gaining insights or lessons learned. 
Sri Lanka’s population is mostly divided between Sinhalese and Tamil speaking 
groups. The Sinhalese, predominately Buddhists, represent 74% of the population while 
the Tamils, predominately Hindu, comprise 18%.278  Both groups claim to be the original 
settlers of Sri Lanka nearly 2500 years ago, yet lived in relative peace with one another 
up until western colonization.279  Under British colonialism, divide and rule policy 
discriminated against the Sinhalese and placed a disproportionate amount of other ethnic 
minorities in government bureaucracy and educational system. The Tamils especially 
benefited from their high English literacy taught by American missionaries.280  Post-
colonial rule brought these tensions into the open as the majority Sinhalese government 
sought to remedy the imbalance in the bureaucracy and education system. In 1956, 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike won the Prime Ministry by appealing to the mass linguistic 
identity with a “Sinhala-only, and in twenty-four hours” policy.281  
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Soon afterwards, legislation made Sinhalese the official language of Sri Lanka, 
officials who did not speak Sinhalese were given a timeline to learn or lose their jobs and 
Tamils were given a higher requirement on entry exams to gain admittance to 
universities.282  Under this new system, the Tamils responded with protests, rallies, and 
boycotts. This in turn led to Sinhalese counter protests followed by escalating scale 
violence on both sides such as the 1974 killing of 9 Tamils by Sinhalese policemen.283 
Two years later, the radical Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) were established as 
on organized resistance group, fighting for an independent Tamil state. Violence hit a 
high mark in 1983 after the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan military soldiers.284  After this, 
full scale civil war erupted between the Sir Lankan government forces and the LTTE. For 
three decades, this bitter war displaced hundreds of thousands and witnessed human 
rights violations on all sides. In May of 2009, the LTTE was crushed in a final battle that 
killed the leader.285  
With the Tigers vanquished and 287,000 Tamils safely locked in government 
refugee camps, President Mahinda Rajapaksa promised he would engage the Tamil 
people and take action to foster national reconciliation.286  This resulted in 8 handpicked 
government members forming a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC). 
The LLRC was given a weak mandate to investigate the causes and circumstances of why 
a ceasefire was broken between February 21, 2002 through May 19, 2009.287  Its 
investigative process relied largely on government materials, did not enter off limits areas 
where the heaviest civilian casualties occurred, or seek to protect witnesses that did come 
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forward.288  Even more controversial, the report did not investigate the known 
government violations of human rights during the war, leading groups like Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group to sharply 
condemn the report as biased and call for international accountability.289   
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
No reconciliation process is perfect. It may take generations to be achieved, if 
even a full reconciliation is at all possible. In the present, the efforts of these 5 countries 
do share overlapping indicators that led to positive and negative short-term results. Most 
of the reviewed countries chose to separate truth and justice into two processes. First 
uncovering the truth in past events (or make nationally known what is already locally 
known) and provide a public report of what happened. Then several states instituted a 
justice process based on the results. This provided time for countries like Peru and 
Liberia to travel throughout a country, take statements, exhume graves, build databases, 
and craft a more full narrative of what happened, before then assigning guilt and 
proceeding with trials.   
Rwanda elected not to separate this process and to limit the truth-finding to 
actions on one ethnic side. This permitted one ethnic group to lay mass accusations 
against another group and leave no room for criticizing the process. This does not bode 
well for building reconciliation. Justice is never one-sided. In Sri Lanka, the entire world 
knows (and the UN has even acknowledged)  that in the course of its civil war, the 
military committed atrocities such as intentional shelling of civilians and destroying of 
medical centers.290  Yet its reconciliation process was completely biased and ignored 
this. It is unlikely that the thousands of Tamils who lost innocent family, friends, and 
neighbors are going to forget. Just as reconciliation is not defined as a single group 
process, nor should investigating truth or giving justice be limited to a single group. 
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Legitimacy is important to the process. This begins with who is picked to be on a 
truth and reconciliation committee. Is the group perceived as an independent or merely 
government appointed toadies?  Sri Lanka did this and resulted in an obvious pro-
government bias recognized by many. It took Liberia’s commission two years before 
other groups could agree on the members. South Africa had a more independent 
commission with public voting, civil society screening, government final election process 
that resulted in a diverse group. Depending on the context, witness protection may also be 
a requirement. It is only logical that people will not come forward to give information if 
they feel that doing so threatens their life or that of their families. If witnesses are 
susceptible to intimidation as in Rwanda and Sri Lanka, legitimacy may be hard to attain. 
A witness protection program is an advanced endeavor that requires a degree of state 
bureaucracy, however.   
Delivering justice is perhaps the most challenging aspect. Accountability must be 
balanced between punishment in the name of justice and forgiveness/amnesty in the name 
of reconciliation. This line will vary from country to country. From the case studies, it 
appears that the needle leans more  reconciliation than justice. A country like Peru may 
draw criticisms for not being slow or not aggressive enough with prosecutions, yet the 
opposite end of the spectrum can threaten renewed violence as in the case of Liberia. 
South Africa’s truth-for amnesty is an interesting compromise, but it depends on being 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Syria remains locked in a bitter civil war and there is no foreseeable end at the 
time of this writing. In assuming a future environment where Assad loses power and the 
opportunity for peace exists, three immediate problems that will hinder stability in Syria 
are examined. By piecing together academic theories and real-world applications, one 
cone can devise a rough “best practices” model for post-Assad Syria to minimize ethnic 
strife and avert a return to civil war.   Much of the literature and cased studies included 
African examples, inviting critics to question the applicability to an Arab state.   To this, 
the author submits that these examples are all we have as a guide. Much of the focus of 
this thesis is new territory for the Mid East. While this model is far from any sort of 
guarantee, it does offer a minimum starting point for consideration for planners interested 
in a stable post-Assad Syria. 
 
 End large scale violence with a negotiated peace settlement between the 
leaders of all armed groups- not figurehead representatives. 
 Peace settlement should call for international guarantees and agree on an 
arms management structure to control violence. 
 Armed groups are held accountable by combination of its leaders agreeing 
to abide by treaty terms and capable international force to deter any side 
from reneging.  
 Credible third party peacekeeping force best way to manage domestic 
anarchy and prisoner’s dilemma between rebel and government forces.   
 Turkey and Russia each represent the strongest combination of state 
interest and military capacity to take the lead role of an international 
peacekeeping mission in Syria. 
 The monopoly of violence is gradually returned to the Syrian government 
by an agreed upon plan that manages security sector reform and 
disarmament of armed groups. Rebels groups cannot be expected to disarm 
if state security forces still pose threat. 
 There are many different ways to approach DDR and SSR. The important 
factor is to link together in a combined approach that all sides agree to. 
Creating new state security apparatus with select integration of rebels 
through joint committees may be one practical comprise as many career 
military officers are rebel leaders.  
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 Syria should adopt a power sharing democracy for a limited time period to 
facilitate the transition to peace. During this time, all groups will have a say 
in drafting a constitution, legal framework, and truth commission. To avoid 
locking in ethnic differences and becoming politically deadlocked, 
government should transition to a power dividing democratic model. 
 Syria must face its past, uncover the truth, and provide a national narrative 
of what happened during Assad’s rule in power. This begins with 
empowering a neutral, independent truth commission that investigates 
human rights abuses on all sides. 
 Justice must be delivered to the extent possible on an individual basis. The 
negotiated peace plan is likely to call for immunity for many current 
government elites. Those not protected may benefit for a truth for amnesty 
program if there is a credible threat of prosecution. Witnesses, judges, 
lawyers must be protected and free from intimidation. 
 Balance between justice and reconciliation is a fine line. Peace is 
historically served better when needle is closer to amnesty/forgiveness in 
name of reconciliation then toward prosecutions in the name of justice. 
 
A. POST-ASSAD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The immediate challenge for Syria is to develop a safe and secure environment. 
Without this environment, Syria will remain unstable and struggle to rebuild. Minor 
conflicts pose a threat to erupt into widespread conflicts and violent instability in Syria 
would continue to have regional spillover effects on neighboring states. This could 
potentially result in a regional ethnic war with Syria in the center. Steps must be taken by 
both rebel and government elites in order to stabilize the security environment. 
1.  Negotiated Settlement between Leaders of Warring Parties 
The transition from war-time environment to peace-time environment begins with 
a peace agreement on each side. For peace to last, this agreement must be more than 
simple ceasefire or temporary truce, but instead provide the building blocks for a last 
security environment. A basic settlement between government and rebel leaders 
addresses concerns of both parties and calls for an end to conflict. In Syria, this is likely 
to center on an agreement that provides for a new government and guarantees for current 
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regime elites. Regardless of how each side agrees to address each other’s demands, it is 
more important that the agreement is with leaders of the major warring parties. 
After Assad’s fall, another individual (most likely an Alawi General) is likely step 
in and fill the power vacuum. The length of time may vary based on the way Assad 
departs, but the previous actions of government elites suggests that they will form a 
consensus in order to serve their collective interests.291  Based on the constructs of the 
Syrian military, Assad’s replacement will likely retain full control of all government 
forces. The Syrian military is professionally trained and organized under a Soviet 
doctrine.292  The combination of Russian military advising and Hafez Assad’s insistence 
on a personal chain of command from the President to commanders has created a very 
centralized military. While corruption among military commanders is prevalent, the same 
commanders have historically shown little “initiative or the ability to react to opposing 
forces without deferring to their superiors in the chain of command.”293  With such 
control over the Syrian military, there’s little reason to suspect that the forces would 
violate a withdrawal or cease and desist order from the new President. 
The opposition leadership is far murkier. The Syrian National Council (SNC) was 
formed in October of 2011 as a collection of opposition groups in Turkey and served 
point of contact for the international world.294  Two months later Secretary Clinton 
recognized the group as the “leading and legitimate representative of Syrians seeking a 
peaceful transition.”295  Yet the group is internally divided and has little credit with the 
actual opposition fighters inside Syria. This prompted the establishment of the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in November of 2012, with the 
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hopes of encompassing more groups and providing a more effective administration.296  
These political groups appear to be jockeying for position to receive international 
recognition and collect and distribute aid.297  While this is important, it is doubtful that 
these groups have control of the armed groups inside Syria, the way the President does of 
the government forces. 
In order for meaningful peace settlement to exist, leaders of the armed groups 
must be brought on board the peace process. What good is a figurehead organization in 
Istanbul or Qatar agreeing to end hostilities if it does not control the means to do so?  
This is a significant shortcoming with the Syrian opposition. The Free Syrian Army is the 
most visible armed group, comprised initially of former army defectors and led by 
Colonel Riad Assad. Despite its high profile, (including embedding reporters, 
maintaining a website, providing regular online videos, etc.) the group is also a blanket 
organization for many others, and its actual size is unknown as is how much control 
Colonel Assad actually has over the group.298   
When it comes time to sign an accord on behalf of the Syrian rebels, all of its 
major armed groups must be organized with leaders that can effectively control, 
represent, and hold their forces accountable. To affect this end, an effort needs to be 
made to identify who the large, organized militia groups are, recognize its leadership, and 
provide incentives to hold its forces accountable and join the others groups at the 
negotiating table when the time comes. This may require facing a harsh reality that many 
of powerful rebel groups inside the Syrian opposition may be radical Islamists. As 
unpalatable as this cooperation may seem, it is better than the alternative of excluding a 
powerful armed group  If unchecked, a single spoiler group has the ability to easily drag 
Syria back into civil war, the same way a single rebel group in Congo did despite the 22 
other groups having agreed to peace.299 
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2. Gain Committed and Capable International Support 
International support will be crucial to fostering a security in post-Assad Syria. 
Not just with aid, but in providing international peacekeepers. Peacekeeping missions are 
often criticized, but evidence does support that peacekeepers have a significant impact on 
reducing war recurrence.300  What’s more, a third party peacekeeping force offers a tool 
to manage the domestic anarchy and accompanying prisoner’s dilemma situations that 
has immediately followed some many other peace agreements. Because neither the 
Syrian government nor the rebel groups will have vanquished each other, each will retain 
the capacity to renew violence and renege on peace terms when a clear advantage is 
perceived. Neither side has reason to trust the other. An international peacekeeping force 
can observe all parties and enforce compliance by raising the cost of reneging on terms.  
In the case of Syria, this international mechanism is likely to be a UN mandated 
peacekeeping force. Syria’s opposition is divided in their support of foreign soldiers 
inside Syria with some agreeing to the presence of armed peacekeepers if Assad is 
removed from power.301  The U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations reported on October 22, 2012 that his group had already begun drafting plans 
to send peacekeepers to Syria once the sides agreed to cease-fire.302   
As discussed however, not all peacekeeping is equal. Peacekeeping missions have 
shown to be more effective when a state has both a national interest and sufficient 
military capacities. What states best fit this category with regard to Syria?  A better 
question may be what states have security interests, economic investments, strategic 
interests, alliance loyalties, or past colonial ties with Syria?  The list of potential countries 
meeting the criteria includes:  France with colonial ties, Russia with deep economic and 
strategic interests, Iran with its own strategic interests and alliance with the regime, and 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Israel share security concerns as neighboring states. For 
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obvious reasons, Israel is not an option. Nor is Iran a realistic option to lead a UN 
peacekeeping mission. The return of any French forces in Syria would not be met with 
enthusiasm. Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon are each facing their own internal challenges. 
Even if they possessed the political will to fully endorse a peacekeeping mission, their 
combined military strength is still far behind the capacity of the Syrian military.303 This 
leaves Russia and Turkey as the two countries with the strongest state interest and 
military capacity to lead a UN peacekeeping mission. 
Turkey is already supporting the opposition in a number of ways. It has opened its 
borders to Syrian refugees (over 1630,000 as of Jan. 2013) and spent $40 million per 
month to provide healthcare and education in its refugee camps.304  Opposition groups 
operate freely in Turkey. Finally Turkey closed its border to commercial traffic with 
Syria and significantly reduced trade including all electricity sales.305   
Russia has cautiously supported Assad’s regime while trying to foster intra-Syrian 
dialogue. Russia has strategic ties to Syria with its weapon sales, navy base in Tartar, and 
thousands of Russians living in Syria.306  Some may argue that Russia’s support for 
Assad and veto of stronger actions at the UN Security Council may make it impossible 
for Russia to play a supporting role in post-Assad Syria. If it becomes evident that the 
Assad ship will sink, it is conceivable that as a rational actor, Russia may switch sides to 
preserve its interests with a new government. There are already signs of this as Russian 
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev recently claimed Assad “has made a grave, possibly 
fatal mistake,” and that “ his chances of retaining power are getting ‘smaller and smaller’ 
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every day.”307  This prompted the Free Syrian Army opposition to respond, “The unified 
command of the Free Syrian Army views the statements made by the Russian prime 
minister on Syria and the fate of Bashar al-Assad as Russia’s new position  the Syrian 
crisis.” 308 
3. Agree on an Arms Management Plan 
Also important to the long-term security of Syria, is agreeing to an arms 
management strategy. This includes how best to best disarm the vast groups of militias 
throughout Syria with DDR programs, how to best reform the security sector into 
organizations that do not threaten the Syrian citizenry, and in what order these two are 
sequenced. As the current Libyan situation has shown, security cannot be outsourced to 
militias if the state is to move forward.309   
For these reasons, an inclusive solution for disarmament and security reform 
needs to be agreed by the armed groups. Different states have pursued a variety of 
methods, and there is no one approach that stands out above the others. Common 
agreements include setting percentages of rebel forces to disarm and quotas to integrate 
rebels into the state police and military structures. Facilitating rebel and military 
integration into a common structure requires mutual cooperation between military and 
rebel leaders. Some states utilized joint technical committees that included international 
experts to examine how best to integrate forces and develop future security and defense 
strategies.310  In Syria, this model may work well, as a number of rebel leaders are former 
Syrian officers who defected, such as Colonel Assad of the FSA. As career military 
officers and rebel leaders, these men have a unique understanding of each armed side and 
will be well positioned to foster an integration approach. 
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While some may argue that disarming rebels must be done immediately, this need 
not be the case. Certainly the monopoly of legitimate force needs to be returned to the 
state—but it may be more practical to do so gradually over a period of time. Weapons are 
the only means of protection for rebels against the arsenal of the state military apparatus. 
These opposition groups will be in no hurry to completely disband and disarm until the 
security sector has reformed to a point where it does not threaten them. Rebuilding police 
and military institutions take time. In the case of South Africa, the ANC did not disarm 
all of its armed wings until it was in firm control of the state and military four years after 
the accord.311  This may work for Syria providing that the rebels who retain their 
weapons as a fallback measure are accountable to elites who have the ability (and 
interest) to control their forces. 
It is easy to emphasize the importance for armed groups agreeing to a strategy. In 
theory, both military and rebels alike stand to benefit from a secure environment. 
Because neither side can fully defeat one another, the prospect should sound appealing on 
paper to creating a new security apparatus where neither military nor rebels dominate by 
structure or culture.312  On the practical level this is an extreme challenge. These groups 
are waging war with one another every day. It may seem an oversimplification to claim 
that elites from warring groups just need to agree to commit to a plan, but this is far from 
simple. It is frustrating from both an academic and policy making perspective that there is 
such little guidance for how to affectively achieve this. Even if disarming and reform of 
the security sector go exactly as planned, it is only one piece of the larger complex 
challenge. A stable security environment still requires “an entire package of legal, 
political, and institutional reforms.”313 
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B. DEMOCRATIC ENGINEERING 
When Syria moves toward developing a democracy, it will do so with an 
extremely divided society. The underlying divisions between religious groups in Syria 
after the Ottoman were exploited by the French divide-and-rule policy. This paved the 
path for the Alawite minority to use the military as a ladder to seize political power 20 
years later. For decades, Alawites dominated Syria and maintained privileged 
government and military positions. Many Christians and Sunni businessmen also 
benefitted under the authoritarian government and are now caught between support for 
Assad and fear for a violent change. The Sunni majority has led the protest and 
opposition movement.314  With over 70% of the population, democracy will place Sunni 
Muslims in power. Many fear that this power will be used to assert Sunni dominance over 
other groups or possibly to take revenge on Alawites or Christians.315 
The nature of the ethnic divisions in Syria must be taken into account when 
deciding on a democracy for Syria. Because the risk of sectarian strife and ethnic civil 
war in Syria is real, majoritarian democracy models must be rejected. The benefit of 
consolidating power and quickly implementing change in Syria is appealing, but not at 
the expense of shutting minority groups from power who fear for their future. Power 
consolidation could work well in other states if the minority in question is a subgroup or 
does not present any foreseeable threat to use violence as means of recourse. Where the 
minority groups like the Alawi have history of deep tensions, divisions, and use of 
violence with the majority, immediately consolidating power is not feasible. Democracy 
should work to minimize ethnic violence, not provide another instrument for it. This 
leaves the two approaches of power sharing and power dividing for plausible models of 
democracy in Syria. Proponents of each theory offer case studies and data sets supporting 
evidence, yet neither is conclusive in demonstrating one side is more likely to offer peace 
and stability. 
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Power sharing has become the standard approach for building peace and 
democracy after a civil war.316  The reason for this phenomenon is the ability for power 
sharing arrangements to help facilitate a transition to peace by providing an immediate 
compromise between ethnic elites.317 In the long term, power sharing arrangements have 
trended  political stagnation in a variety of countries ranging from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Liberia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. This is largely a consequence of 
ethnicity becoming reified in politics to the point where ethnic parties cannot reach an 
agreement with others resulting in a political deadlock.318  Syria’s ethnic divisions leave 
nothing to suggest it would fare any different in the long term under power sharing 
arrangements.  
Power dividing sounds very appealing on paper. By splitting power among 
multiple majorities, the “nation state stewardship” concept deemphasizes the nature of 
ethnicity in politics.319  It would be ideal if Syria reached a point where shared mutual 
interests lead to Syrians perceiving one another as doctors, engineers, and teachers 
instead of Sunni, Alawi, or Druze. But is this model realistic for Syria immediately 
following post-civil war?   
For a government to succeed under power-division there must be a civil society 
with elites from all ethnic groups ready to take limited power and drive decisions. A 
justice system must be able to protect the rights of those groups and careful legal crafting 
is necessary to set checks and balances to ensure no majority group can dominate over 
another. This advanced government appears beyond the immediate reach of immediate 
grasp of post-conflict Syria with hundreds of thousands of refugees having already fled 
the country and the economy in ruin. The Syrian pound has devalued 72% in less than 
three years as the economy has shrunk from pre-conflict $57.5 billion to 2013 levels of 
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$27 billion.320  Much of Syria’s infrastructure is devastated, including schools, medical 
centers, and power grids. While this may not be inclusive of all of Syria, these represent 
significant short-term problems that would hinder an advanced power dividing approach 
initially. 
In light of these facts, the model would benefit a post-Assad Syria in both short 
and long term is a combination of each. Begin with a consociational power sharing 
arrangement as advocated by Lijphart that affords the guarantees of ethnic quotas and 
veto power, but limit the time for this government to set amount of years before an 
agreement to transition to the multiple majority power-dividing system. This arrangement 
allows the strengths of each approach to work in Syria.   
By offering power sharing arrangements such as ethnic quotas and minority veto, 
elites have an incentive to agree on a civil war peace settlement. This should also help to 
alleviate the concerns of Alawi and other minority groups of an unchallenged Sunni 
dominance. During this time, the power-sharing government can focus on the immediate 
post-conflict challenges such as drafting a constitution, reforming a justice system, 
rebuilding infrastructure, managing refugee returns, and forming a consensual 
reconciliation approach. Bosnia offers an example of a power-sharing state that is 
politically deadlocked today, but did address many immediate post-conflict challenges 
such as returning most property to prewar owners, rebuilding homes and bridges, paving 
highways, developing a tourism industry, and gradually reducing the number of 
peacekeepers and NGOs in its country.321   
In order to avoid stagnating under power-sharing agreements that require approval 
from multiple groups, Syria would hold elections and transition government forms after 
the set number of years. Once a legal framework is in place, the country is in rebuilding 
mode, refugees have returned home, and civil society has a safe enough environment to 
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begin engaging in unions and other associations, then Syria will be in a position to 
construct multiple majority groups to divide power among. This approach of beginning 
with power sharing and transitioning to a different system has been done successfully by 
South Africa. 
During South Africa’s post-apartheid era, power sharing arrangements were 
utilized from 1993–1996.322  Both white and black elites officially recognized the need to 
facilitate economic recovery, reinforce a spirit of national unity, and guide the country 
through an uncertain change.323  Each group had reasons for their own self-interest 
reasons also. Despite having the obvious majority support, the ANC agreed to share 
power also out of a “strategic necessity” to minimize a revolutionary threat from 
emerging in the outgoing bureaucracy, security forces, or other potential spoiler 
groups.324  Other parties knew that it was only a matter of time before the ANC would 
emerge as the leading government party, yet participated in power sharing as an 
opportunity to negotiate for policies that would protect and benefit their groups. This 
included placing limits on majority power in the new constitutions, forming a strong 
judiciary, providing private property rights, and gaining provisions for cultural and 
language rights.325  This process was contentious, but ultimately a new constitution was 
passed in 1996 with a 421–2 vote, that placed structured a new majoritarian style 
democracy.326  There is no reason that Syria could not approach the transition to power 
dividing democracy. 
C. POST-CONFLICT RECONCILIATION 
The decision for a post-Assad government to pursue a reconciliation approach 
may very well set the path for Syria’s future for generation. There are risks either way 
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and no one can say for certain that Syria will be benefit from attempting to repair 
relations between its ethnic groups. Three facts however, strongly indicate the necessity 
to do so.   
First, there is the incentive not to follow a path of neighboring Lebanon. Lebanon 
chose not pursue any form reconciliation after its civil war, ignored its past, and focused 
on peace in the future. Today, the country is strongly divided and remains unstable.327  
Syria does not want to become Lebanon. Next, there is the staggering amount of 
atrocities and human rights abuses that are happening on a daily basis in Syria-from both 
sides. The more deaths and disappearances, the more traumatized society becomes, and 
the more opportunities to build hate and resentment  ethnic groups. Finally, the leading 
oppositions groups have continuously listed accountability as one of their stated goals 
that they are working for.328 
If Syria does pursue reconciliation, there are lessons from past approaches that 
should be applied. Reconciliation requires acknowledgement of the truth and 
accountability to bring individuals to justice. Most states divided these objectives into 
separate mechanisms in the form of truth commissions and trials. It is important that 
these processes be applied to all sides of the conflict equally. In the cases of Rwanda and 
Sri Lanka, investigating truth and assigning blame became one-sided. This is 
counterproductive to reconciling between ethnic groups. The same result is likely in Syria 
to happen if truth and justice processes are limited to only crimes committed by the 
Syrian government.   
There is no question that the Syrian military, secret police (mukhabarat), and state 
militias (shabbihia) are committing gross human rights abuses and have much to answer 
for. Equally certain though, are that rebel groups are committing atrocities against 
soldiers and civilians. The UN Human Rights Council commission of inquiry is one of 
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several groups that have accused both sides of committing crimes against humanity.329  
Truth and justice must be pursued for all victims of Syria. 
A crucial part of affording truth and justice to all groups is in structure the 
mechanisms in a way that is perceived as legitimate. This begins with the selection of 
members for truth committees or trial. There is no set formula for how to decide who is a 
neutral, respectable person. In many cases, the governments in power simply picked 
people, other times it did so in conjunction with other ethnic parties, and sometimes with 
public voting civil society screening. Whatever the method for Syria, it is important that 
the members represent the diversities of Syria’s ethnic groups, be perceived as neutral, 
and independent of the government.   
Truth commission can only be as effective as its mandate and resources allow. 
Many of the more effective examples discussed in this chapter received resources to 
collect thousands of statements, compile victims’ databases, and protect witnesses that 
come forward. A mandate that empowers the Syrian truth commission to subpoena, 
conduct searches, and seize evidence may aid in the process of truth-finding only if its 
members are diverse and perceived as legitimate. Otherwise, it may serve to deepen 
divides with the perception as an ethnic tool out for revenge. Finally, the mandate for the 
commission needs to have a specific timeline for events to investigate. A good starting 
point may be the time of Bashar Assad’s rule until the day of the peace settlement. 
Delivering justice is the most challenging aspect. Some amnesty measures will 
have to have already been in place before a peace treaty even arrives. It is simply not 
feasible for Assad’s replacement to agree to a settlement where he and his associates risk 
prosecution and imprisonment. This must be a carefully managed process as blanket 
amnesty for all will not meet the accountability process of reconciliation. On the other 
side, assigning mass guilt to everyone and either dismantling an entire military (Iraq-
style) or bringing half of the adult male population of an ethnic group to trials (Rwanda-
style), are not actions conducive to repairing relationships. There is no way to asses 
where in the future this line should be drawn or how many individuals should be 
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prosecuted. With history as a guide however, erring on the side closer to amnesty and 
forgiveness yields criticism for not prosecuting enough, while being too aggressive has 
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